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Although the IDEA purports to entitle disabled children to a "free,
appropriate, public education" (FAPE), disagreements regarding the
concept of "appropriateness" have been an ongoing source of conflict
between parents and educators. While parents demand that school
districts and other educational service providers program so as to
maximize the child's potential, school personnel frequently insist that an
educational program is "appropriate" within the meaning of the Act if it
permits a child to make any progress at all. This Article proposes a
middle ground under which the "appropriateness" of a program is to be
judged on an individualized basis taking into consideration each child's
potential for educational growth.
Additionally, based on personal experience gained in years of
litigation with schools over the appropriateness of special education
programs and services, many of the common abuses of the system
established by the IDEA are identified and changes are suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (the "Act") in 1975, Congress sought to guarantee educational rights
for disabled children.' The Act-largely spurred2 by consent decrees in
Mills v. Board of Education3 and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania4-- envisioned a system under which, after the
identification of children in need of special education, parents of disabled
children and school districts would collaborate to design publicly funded
1. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later,
154 U. PA. L. REv. 789, 803-04 (2006) (outlining the history of special education
legislation prior to 1975). The Act was subsequently reauthorized by Congress a number
of times. In 1990, the name was changed to the Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA"). This Article will use both names.
2. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1430
(explaining the cases that provided the impetus for the Act).
3. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
4. Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
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programs to meet the individualized needs of the children. In the
language of the Act, each identified child was to receive a "[f]ree
appropriate public education" ("FAPE").5  Recognizing that
disagreement between parents and educators as to the appropriateness of
the proposed program inevitably would occur in at least some cases, the
Act provided for a legal process under which the "aggrieved party"-
usually a dissatisfied parent-could challenge either the identification or
failure to identify a child as one in need of special education services, the
content, or implementation of the proposed program itself.6
Soon after the legislation was enacted, it became apparent that the
collaborative model was seriously flawed. Some scholars insisted that
the very idea of individualized programming was antithetical to the
culture of school districts and thus doomed from the outset.7 Public
schools, seeking one-size-fits-all programming that would adequately
serve to educate a large majority (but not all) of their students,8 could not
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012).
6. Whether one must exhaust administrative remedies under the Act to challenge
the implementation of an agreed-upon Individualized Educational Program ("IEP") is a
matter of some dispute. See infra notes 149-168 and accompanying text. It should also
be noted that the 2004 Amendments to the Act required that states take steps to ensure
that special education teachers "be highly qualified." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(C) (2012).
Although § 1412(a)(14)(E) specifically declined to provide students with a right of action
based on a lack of teacher qualification, to the extent that lack of qualification prevents
the provision of an appropriate education, it can be raised as part of a due process
challenge. See Mark. C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REv. 7, 18-19 (2006).
7. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy
Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 795 (1973) (observing
"[t]o the extent that any bright new idea threatens to undermine this culture of the school,
it is for that reason [viewed as] suspect"); see also Joel F. Handler, Dependent People,
the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 999, 1010 (1988). Handler comments:
The procedures [established by the Act] have been distorted by the exigencies
of the bureaucracy. The average parent, especially in lower socio-economic
classes, does not have the ability to participate. In addition to the psychological
burdens of coping with a handicapped child, most parents lack the information
and the resources to deal with the school bureaucracy.
Id.
8. See Richard L. Allington, You Can't Learn Much from Books You Can't Read,
60 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 16, 17 (2002). Allington observes:
Schools have typically exacerbated the [student reading] problem by relying on
a single-source curriculum design-purchasing multiple copies of the same
science and social studies textbooks for every student. This "one-size-fits-all"
approach works well if we want to sort students into academic tracks. It fails
miserably if our goal is high academic achievement for all students.
Id. (citation omitted).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2
truly individualize programming to meet the needs of every child for
whom they were made responsible.9
The problem, however, is even more complex. This Article argues
that the emergence of several political trends combined to undermine the
educational goals of the legislation. From its inception, there was a
conflict between the two theoretical underpinnings of the Act. The
legislation simultaneously embraced both a rights theory and
utilitarianism. "A rights theory requires the provision of education as an
acknowledgement of the disabled person's dignity as a human being. A
utilitarian model, on the other hand, requires the reduction of disability
because of the.., cost effectiveness of such reduction ... ."10 In other
words, the former demanded the provision of services regardless of cost.
The latter required only the provision of cost-effective services.
Moreover, the Act did not directly address whether cost effectiveness
was to be assessed over the long-term or in the short-term."
Regardless of what may have been the drafters' original intent,
judicial interpretation in the years following enactment increasingly
allowed short-term cost considerations to trump both long-term
efficiency and a rights approach.'2  The consequence, undoubtedly
unintended, was to create a gap between parental expectations and school
9. See William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap
Analysis, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 53 (1985). Clime and Van Pelt explain:
One of the conspicuous failures of the Act was the ideal of individually
appropriate education. What occurred instead was the establishment of
routinized special programs. Individualized programs fell victim to lack of
technical knowledge, budgetary constraints, and the needs of schools for
routinized procedures. As organizations with many functions, schools must be
able to plan for special education within a finite budget. The idea of a
customized education for every handicapped child violated these fundamental
organizational precepts.
Id.
10. Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's
Perspective and Proposalfor Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 331, 335 (1994).
11. Although much of the legislative history supports the argument that goals
included both long-term cost effectiveness and the dignity of the child. See Polk v. Cent.
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1988). Judge Becker
summarized the goals indicated in the legislative history:
The [Act]'s sponsors stressed the importance of teaching skills that would
foster personal independence for two reasons. First, they advocated dignity for
handicapped children. Second, they stressed the long-term financial savings of
early education and assistance for handicapped children. A chief selling point
of the Act was that although it is penny dear, it is pound wise-the expensive
individualized assistance early in life, . . . eventually redounds to the benefit of
the public fisc as these children grow to become productive citizens.
Id.; see also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
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responsibilities.13 The basic problem is simply this: parents of disabled
children, often already reeling from the emotional trauma of a diagnosis,
enter the world of special education with the expectation that the schools
will do their best for the children.14  School administrators, special
education teachers, and therapists of varied specialties encourage and
reinforce the parents' assumptions that the parents' goals for their child
are shared by the educational establishment, when, in fact, they are not.
In some cases, the deception is deliberate-perhaps cynical.15 In other
instances, it is undoubtedly well intentioned.
In any event, when parents learn, or come to believe, that schools
are not offering programming designed to meet their expectations, and
educators seek to justify their actions by pointing to technical legal
requirements, the predictable response is anger and suspicion by the
parents and defensiveness by the schools. Although under other
circumstances rational discussion of scarce resources might be possible,
in the face of perceived betrayal it is a minor miracle that lawsuits are the
only result.'
6
The other political trend was the emergence (or reemergence) of the
view that rights created by contract are superior to, and take precedence
over, rights created by law-in this case federal statute.'7 This same
trend is observable in the ongoing tension between tort and contract
13. See Kotler, supra note 10, at 371-72, 391-92 (proposing that the Act be
amended to require disclosure).
14. See Jeannie F. Lake & Bonnie S. Billingsley, An Analysis of Factors that
Contribute to Parent-School Conflict in Special Education, 21 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL
EDUC. 240, 247 (2000). Lake and Billingsley explain:
Parents reported looking to the school as the experts and the people who should
know what to do. Parents expressed disappointment when they realized their
school's shortcomings. One parent described[:] . . . "When your child is
diagnosed with special needs . . . you go through a grief process. Well, you
also go through a grief process when you realize the special education system
has a disorder."
Id.
15. See Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA:
Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
423, 446 (2012) (concluding that the "tension [inherent in the requirement of an
'appropriate' education and a chronic shortage of funding] has eroded the collaborative
nature of the IDEA and has turned it into a dishonest process of downplaying parental
concerns in an effort to guard the school district's budget").
16. Parents of disabled children are under significant time pressure as well. The
Act covers the child until age 21. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). After age 21, there
are virtually no educational programs available. See infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text. While school districts can waste a couple of years attempting to find
educational programming to which t e child might respond, neither the parents nor the
disabled child have the luxury of wasting time with false starts.
17. See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
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rights.18  Just as there is a view-perhaps ascendant-that contract
trumps tort regardless of the relative bargaining power of the parties to
the contract,19 parents' contracts with school districts for the provision of
special education services are being enforced regardless of the
consequences to the disabled child or the societal interest in educating
children.2 °
To further complicate matters, while parents come to perceive
themselves as victims of deception fighting for their children, others-
school district personnel and, increasingly, parents of non-disabled
children--often perceive the parents of disabled children as greedy,
much as personal injury plaintiffs are portrayed as greedy when seeking
compensation.2 1 Not only are parents of disabled children seen as
demanding favored treatment, but they are portrayed as doing so at the
expense of others. Given that our current political climate favors tax
reduction and seeks to limit public expenditure, vilifying recipients of
public spending is an easy sell.
This Article seeks to offer at least a partial solution to what is
seemingly an intractable problem. While I previously argued that the
Act should be amended to require disclosure, I have since come to
believe that, in many cases, such a disclosure obligation already exists
based on the relationship between parents of disabled children and the
educational agencies charged with the responsibilities created by the Act.
Even if school districts or other local educational agencies are not
required to provide optimal programming, educators are required to tell
parents what, in their professional opinion, would constitute such a
program, even if financial constraints make its provision by the district or
agency impossible.23
18. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 112 (1974) ("It may be that, in
this centennial year, some new Langdell is already waiting in the wings to summon us
back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, order, and well-articulated theory. Contract
is dead-but who knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter-tide may bring?").
19. See Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort
Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 779, 783-87 (2007).
20. See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text; see also infra note 27.
21. See Kotler, supra note 19, at 795-96.
22. See Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't Enough: External Advocacy in
Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1825 (2008) (citing Hamilton Lankford & James
Wyckoff, The Allocation of Resources to Special Education and Regular Instruction, in
HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN EDUCATION 221,
228 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996) (noting that "many parents of 'regular education' children
see special education budgets as encroaching upon the funds available to their own
children tend to oppose special education funding").
23. See Lake & Billingsley, supra note 14, at 246 (explaining how "masked" (i.e.,
unacknowledged) fiscal constraints lead to parental suspicion of educational agencies).
[Vol. 119:2
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As a practical matter, the recognition of such a disclosure
requirement would not only force special educators to investigate
programs and thus remain current in their fields, but also to confront
shortcomings in the programming being offered. More importantly, a
disclosure requirement would also serve to eliminate the gap in
expectations between parents and educators and the resulting distrust
currently created by the discovery of differing expectations. Finally, if
educators are required to confront parents in an open and honest fashion,
personal and professional pride should create an impetus to improve
programming.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I, after providing a brief
overview of the legislation and certain relevant amendments, articulates
the basis for parental distrust of the educational establishment and
explores the judicial decisions interpreting the Act and the legislative
amendments that have exacerbated the problems inherent in the law.
Part II makes the case for a duty to disclose owed to parents and notes
some of the remedies that might be available for breach of that obligation
to disclose.
1. THE BACKGROUND: WHY THE ACT HAS NOT WORKED AS
ENVISIONED
A. The Basic Structure of the Legislation and the "Appropriateness"
Standard
Because many disabled children had been excluded from public
education prior to 1975,24 Congress, through the Act, sought initially to
set up a process by which states would find children in need of
educational services and bring them into the system.25 Although the Act
did not declare education to be a fundamental protected right and
subsequent federal judicial decisions have stopped short of giving
24. See Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 9, at 15 ("Estimates of the number of
children denied educational services in the 1970's ranged from one to two million
children. Congress accepted the one million figure in justifying passage of the EAHCA
in 1975.") (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. (discussing the "Child Find" procedures).
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education that status,26 education was generally agreed to be an important
right given its obvious personal, political, and economic implications.27
While Congress has repeatedly amended the Act, certain basic
features have been left intact. After a child is identified as one in need of
special educational services,28 the child is evaluated by a multi-
disciplinary evaluation team.29  The team, made up of parents and
educators, prepares an Individualized Educational Program ("IEP").
30
The IEP sets forth the agreed-upon educational goals for the child and, if
done properly, contains various progress measures so that it can be
determined whether the child is meeting the agreed-upon educational
goals.31
26. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) ("We
have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding
that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments
unpersuasive."). The right has been deemed fundamental in a majority of states. Michael
Salerno, Reading is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act Necessitates
Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
509, 511 (2007).
27. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (unanimously
recognizing that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments"). The Court also stated:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.
Id.
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2012). Under the 2004 Amendments to the Act, up
to 15% of the funds allocated for special education can be diverted to "at risk" students,
defined somewhat vaguely as students "who need additional academic and behavioral
support to succeed in a general educational environment" but not "otherwise identified as
needing special education or related services" under the law. Id. § 1413(f)(1).
29. Id. § 1414(b)-(c).
30. Id. § 1414(d).
31. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A). Section 1414(d)(1)(A) provides:
(i) The term "individualized education program" or "IEP" means a written
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and
revised in accordance with this section and that includes-
(I) a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and
functional performance, including-
(aa) how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress in
the general education curriculum;
(II) a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional
goals, designed to-
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If the school district has a program in place or can create a program
that would meet the child's needs, the child may be assigned to that
program. In some cases where the child's needs cannot be met within
the district, the child may be assigned to a private school believed to
have the personnel and expertise necessary to provide a program to meet
the IEP goals. Because of the Act's guarantee of a public education, in
cases of public placement in a private school, the district must either pay
the private school or reimburse the parents for the costs incurred.32 To
level the playing field between parents of disabled children (and the
children themselves) and the Local Educational Agency ("LEA"),
33
parents were explicitly provided with legal rights and procedures
(aa) meet the child's needs that result from the child's disability to enable the
child to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum;
and
(bb) meet each of the child's other educational needs that result from the child's
disability;
(III) a description of how the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals
described in subclause (II) will be measured and when periodic reports on the
progress the child is making toward meeting the annual goals (such as through
the use of quarterly or other periodic reports, concurrent with the issuance of
report cards) will be provided;
(IV) a statement of the special education and related services and
supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent
practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a
statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that
will be provided for the child.
Id.
32. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B). Section 1412(a)(10)(B) provides:
Children placed in, or referred to, private schools by public agencies
(i) In general
Children with disabilities in private schools and facilities are provided special
education and related services, in accordance with an individualized education
program, at no cost to their parents, if such children are placed in, or referred
to, such schools or facilities by the State or appropriate local educational
agency as the means of carrying out the requirements of this subchapter or any
other applicable law requiring the provision of special education and related
services to all children with disabilities within such State.
Id.; see also infra note 40.
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A) (2012) (defining "local educational agency" as "a
public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for
either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public
elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or
other political subdivision of a State"). For the sake of simplicity, most of this Article
refers to "school districts," rather than the technically more accurate LEA designation,
though in many cases, they are the same. In fact, LEA may include various educational
agencies other than school districts. For example, in Pennsylvania, Intermediate Units
have been established to provide younger children with services and, additionally, school
districts often contract with Intermediate Units to provide specialized therapies to older
children. See 11 PA. STAT. ANN., §§ 875-101-106 (West 2014).
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established to compel agency compliance with the law's mandate.34
Parents aggrieved by the school district determination of eligibility or
non-eligibility, the contents of the IEP, or recommended assignment to a
specified program for the provision of the services and implementation
of programming, can demand a hearing before an administrative law
judge for a determination.35 The Act also permits, but does not require,
the creation of a second-tier administrative process administered by the
state department of education to review decisions of the hearing
officers.36 If such a second-tier review panel rules against the parents, or
if the state maintains a one-tier system and the administrative law judge
rules against the parents, the "aggrieved party" may appeal further to a
state court of competent jurisdiction or the federal district court (without
regard for the amount in controversy).
37
34. More recent amendments to the Act and some judicial decisions view the "due
process" protections incorporated into the Act as providing rights to the school districts,
in addition to the parents and children. This, however, does not appear to have been the
original intent of the Act given that both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution guarantee due process rights to individuals, not states or state entities. See
also Kotler, supra note 10, at 393-94 (proposing the Act be amended to make it clear that
only parents and children should have the ight to appeal an adverse decision).
35. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review
Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 401
(2006) (discussing the scope of hearing officers' authority under the Act as interpreted by
the courts).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g). Section 1415(f)--(g) provides, in part, as follows:
(f) Impartial due process hearing
(1) In general
(A) Hearing
Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the
parents or the local educational agency involved in such complaint shall have
an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted
by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as
determined by State law or by the State educational agency.
(g) Appeal
(1) In general
If the hearing required by subsection (f) is conducted by a local educational
agency, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a
hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.
(2) Impartial review and independent decision
The State educational agency shall conduct an impartial review of the findings
and decision appealed under paragraph (1). The officer conducting such review
shall make an independent decision upon completion of such review.
Id; see also Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL. STUD. 3, 3 (2010) (noting that
"[u]nder the IDEA provision for due process hearings..., states have a choice of a one-
tier system that is limited to the hearing officer level, or a two-tier system that provides a
second officer review level to the administrative dispute resolution system prior to either
party resorting to court action").
37. Although the Act specifies that the reviewing court "shall hear additional
evidence. at the request of a party[,]" 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3), in fact, courts are
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From its inception, the Act further provided as follows:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this
section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents
or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current
educational placement of such child, or, if applying for initial
admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents or
guardian, be placed in the public school program until all such
proceedings have been completed.
38
This so-called pendency or stay put provision was to act as an automatic
injunction maintaining an agreed-upon placement, thereby precluding the
school district from removing the child from the public school or private
school program in which the child had been placed.3 9
If the parents and the district were unable to agree on the
appropriateness of the goals to be set forth in the IEP, or if the parents
believed that the program proposed by the educational agency could not
achieve the IEP goals, the parents could unilaterally place the child in a
program that they believed could meet the child's needs. However, if the
parents unilaterally placed the child, the parents had to absorb the cost
unless it was ultimately determined that they were correct in acting as
they did at the time they acted.4 ° Upon such a finding, the parents were
increasingly deferring to hearing officers and disposing of appeals summarily without the
consideration of additional evidence even though it was proffered by a party. See Susan
G. Clark, Judicial Review and the Admission of "Additional Evidence" Under the IDEIA:
An Unusual Mixture of Discretion and Deference, 201 EDUC. L. REP. 823, 823-24 (2005)
(proposing a rule of limiting evidence to "adhere[] to the standards of deference set by
the Supreme Court").
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
39. See, e.g., Taylor F. ex rel Jon F. v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist. 5, 954 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1201 (D. Colo. 2013) (noting that "[b]ecause Plaintiffs are not attempting to
enforce an existing "stay put" order, the Court finds that they need not satisfy the
traditional test for injunctive relief. Rather, this case is governed by the automatic
injunction provisions of the IDEA").
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). Section 1412(a)(10)(C) states:
Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent
of or referral by the public agency
(i) In general
Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not require a local
educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special education
and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if
that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and
the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility.
(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special
education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the
child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of
or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the
agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or
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then entitled to reimbursement for the costs incurred.4' This procedure
of unilateral placement followed by legal action seeking reimbursement
is commonly referred to as "place and chase." The chasing portion of the
process can take years as the case proceeds though the administrative
process specified by the law and then through the courts. Generally
speaking, unless the educational agency agreed to the outside placement
or the parents received a favorable ruling, the pendency rule, which
would require the school district to pay for the outside placement on an
on-going basis,42 did not apply.
1. The Creation of Parent-Educator Distrust
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Hendrick Hudson Board of Education v. Rowley.43 The case arose out of
a disagreement between parents and the school district as to the district's
obligation to provide an in-class sign-language interpreter for a hearing-
impaired child. The parents claimed that the FAPE language of the
statute required the school to provide programming that would maximize
their child's potential. The lower court agreed.4 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and ruled that an educational program was
"appropriate" within the meaning of the Act if it provided "some
benefit." In the Court's language:
Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive
standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded
handicapped children. Certainly the language of the statute contains
no requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts-that States
hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public
education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.
1d. Initially, many believed that he parents needed only to show that they were right as
things turned out, i.e., the child did well in the program in which he or she was
unilaterally placed. In Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Board of Education, 993 F.2d 1031,
1040 (3d Cir. 1993), the court held that the "appropriateness" of a proposed IEP was to
be judged by what was known at the time it was formulated, even though later experience
demonstrated the parent's prescience and the districts lack thereof
41. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Delaware Cnty. Intermediate Unit No. 25 v. Martin K., 831 F. Supp.
1206, 1222 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Judge Robreno observed:
[I]t is true that Paul's parents assumed the initial financial risk that they would
not be reimbursed when they decided to reject the IU's IEP and place Paul in
Lovaas training. That does not mean, however, that they must endure this risk
even after their initial decision is later validated by state authorities.
Id. (citing Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985)).
43. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
44. See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("This
standard would require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve
his full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children."), aff'd,
632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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maximize the potential of handicapped children "commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children." That standard was
expounded by the District Court without reference to the statutory
definitions or even to the legislative history of the Act.
45
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free
appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to
which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational
benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do little good for
Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public
education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from
that education. The statutory definition of "free appropriate public
education," in addition to requiring that States provide each child
with "specially designed instruction," expressly requires the
provision of "such... supportive services... as may be required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." §
1401(17) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that the "basic
floor of opportunity" provided by the Act consists of access to
specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.
46
Since the child in Rowley was passing her courses without the assistance
of a sign language interpreter and passing from grade to grade, the school
district was found to have met its statutory obligation, even though she
might have been earning As and Bs instead of Cs had better
programming been provided.4 7
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the drafters of the Act
intended to provide disabled children with more than just access to
education. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
wrote:
The Act requires more [than just access to specialized instruction]. It
defines "special education" to mean "specifically designed
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child ...... [20 U.S.C.] § 1401(16)
(emphasis added). Providing a teacher with a loud voice would not
meet Amy's needs and would not satisfy the Act. The basic floor of
opportunity is instead, as the courts below recognized, intended to
eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the
child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably
possible. Amy Rowley, without a sign-language interpreter,
45. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-90 (quoting 483 F. Supp. at 534).
46. Id. at 200-01.
47. Id. at 209-10.
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comprehends less than half of what is said in the classroom-less
than half of what normal children comprehend. This is hardly an
equal opportunity to learn, even if Amy makes passing grades.
48
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the congressional record contained
statements from numerous senators stressing the importance of the Act's
goals of providing equal opportunity and of maximizing the child's
potential.49
The Court's decision resulted not only in limiting the substantive
educational goals of the Act, but also created a schism between parents
of disabled children and the educational establishment.0 As any policy
commentator seeking to identify the sources of parent-school conflict
within the context of special education must ultimately acknowledge,
lack of trust is a major factor impeding the realization of the
collaborative model envisioned when the Act was first introduced.51
The "trust literature" distinguishes between two specific definitions
of the term. As Bernard Barber explained:
The first of these two specific definitions is the meaning of trust as
the expectation of technically competent role performance. *** In a
society like ours, where there is such an accumulation of knowledge
and technical expertise, expectations of trust in this sense are very
common. The competent performance expected may involve expert
knowledge, technical facility, or everyday routine performance.
The second meaning of trust... concerns expectations of fiduciary
obligation and responsibility, that is, the expectation that some others
in social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to
48. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 213-14. Justice White reasoned:
The Act itself announces it will provide a 'full educational opportunity to all
handicapped children." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (emphasis added). This goal is
repeated throughout the legislative history, in statements too frequent to be
"passing references and isolated phrases." These statements elucidate the
meaning of "appropriate." . . . The legislative history thus directly supports the
conclusion that the Act intends to give handicapped children an educational
opportunity commensurate with that given other children.
Id. (some internal citations omitted).
50. Although the 2004 amendments to the Act have arguably mandated a revision
of the Rowley definition of "appropriateness," most courts that have since considered the
issue have declared the ongoing validity of the Rowley definition. See Chopp, supra note
15, at 442 (referencing the argument made by Dixie Snow Huefher, Updating the FAPE
Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 377-78 (2008)). See also id. at 442-44
(discussing cases).
51. See, e.g., Lake & Billingsley, supra note 14, at 250 (noting that "[i]n this study,
parents reported that when trust was broken, actions on the part of the school to remedy
the situation were perceived as 'too little, too late').
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demonstrate a special concern for other's interest above their own.
Trust as a fiduciary obligation goes beyond technically competent
performance to the moral dimension of interaction. Technically
competent performance can be monitored insofar as it is based on
shared knowledge and expertise. But when some parties to a social
relationship or some members of a social system cannot comprehend
that expertise, performance can be controlled by trust. A fiduciary
obligation is placed on the holder and user of the special knowledge
and skill with regard to the other members of his social system. Trust
of this kind, then, is a social mechanism that makes possible the
effective and just use of the power that knowledge and position give
and forestalls abuses of that power .... [H]owever, trust as fiduciary
obligation is never wholly sufficient or fully effective as a control
mechanism and requires a set of functional alternatives and
complements.
52
The basic structure of the Act, often referred to as "legalist,
' 53
sought to create the "alternatives and complements" referred to by
Professor Barber in the form of legal enforceability of the substantive
rights it created. in other words, the structure both creates rights and
provides procedural mechanisms for the enforcement of those rights.54
Whether this "legalist" approach is workable remains subject to
considerable dispute.
55
Although they illustrate their general thesis with examples unrelated
to special education disputes, Professors Sitkin and Roth have precisely
defined the problem.56 Reviewing the "trust" literature, they observe that
although "legalism" envisions "the use of contracts, sanctioning
capabilities, or legalistic procedures," such institutional arrangements
serving as "administrative or symbolic substitutes for trust.. ." are
thought "to enhance the legitimacy of otherwise suspect arrangements.57
However, prior research suggests hat:
52. BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 14-16 (1983).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37; see also infra notes 55-60 and
accompanying text.
54. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).
55. In addition to other articles referred to in the notes that follow, see Mark G.
Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and Organizational
Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L REV.
891, 895 ("Legalization rests on the idea of individual rights, particularly procedural
entitlements against the state, which may or may not advance the collective interest.").
56. See generally Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited
Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" of Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. Sci. 367 (1993).
57. Id. at 369 (footnotes omitted).
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Attempts to "remedy" trust violations legalistically frequently fail
because they paradoxically reduce the level of trust rather than
reproducing trust. The adoption of legalistic "remedies" (i.e.
institutionalized mechanism that mimic legal forms and exceed
legal/regulatory requirements) imposes a psychological and/or an
interactional barrier between the two parties that stimulates an
escalating spiral of formality and distance.
58
Sitkin and Roth go on to suggest that:
Legalistic responses are more or less effective depending on the
specific nature of the expectations that have been violated. They can
restore trust expectations effectively when violations are specific to a
particular context or task. However, when fundamental values are
violated, and perceived trustworthiness is undermined across
contexts, then legalistic remedies are ill-suited to restoring lost
trust-and can exacerbate the 59problem due to their effect on
perceived interpersonal distance.
Our perspective-while a sharp departure from much of the literature
on trust-is consistent with the frameworks, terminology,
operationalizations, and concepts used in that literature. For
example, Zucker suggests that disruption of trust arise when ...
"background expectations" (i.e. common world understanding) are
violated.6 °
Why is this important? If parents simply believed that a particular
educational program was not being properly implemented, perhaps
because there was a competence or performance problem that needed to
be addressed, school districts and parents might well be able to work
things out either informally or, in extreme cases, through the legalistic
procedures established by the Act. That, however, often is not the
critical issue. The problem is more fundamental and reflects a
completely different set of expectations and values.61 At least upon their
initial entry into the world of special education, too many parents believe
58. Id. (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at 370 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. (citing L.G. Zucker, Products of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure, 1840-1920, in 8 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 53, 59, 102 (Barry
M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1986)).
61. Professor Chopp attributes the "breakdown of trust between parents and
educators" to the chronic lack of funding for special education. She concludes that while
"[p]arents should be able to trust their children's schools to operate in their best
interests[,] . . . the tension between 'free' and 'appropriate' leads many schools to mask
denial of services in assertions of inappropriateness." Chopp, supra note 15, at 460.
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the school shares their goal of maximizing the potential for their child
and too many school districts, for whatever reason-differing
expectations, fiscal constraints, fungibility of children and, as an
institution, not having to deal with the long-term consequences of their
decisions62-seek to provide the bare minimum allowed by law. The
particular clich6, which dates back at least to 1993, is that school districts
are required to provide the Chevrolet of special education
programming-not the Cadillac.63  This clich6 is virtually never
announced until parents realize that school districts are not seeking to
maximize their child's potential and object on that basis.
Educators, given legal license to not perform the jobs for which
they were trained, naturally respond with defensiveness and
ambivalence, further fanning the flames of the conflict. Are they now to
tell parents "we are sorry, but we can't help your child," or "we could
help your child but we are not going to"? Or are they going to lie or at
the very least remain silent about issues that are of supreme importance
to the students and their parents?
2. Long-Term Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Face of Short-Term
Fiscal Constraints
To further understand the problems and potential for conflict
created by the Court's interpretation in Rowley, it is necessary to grasp
the vast array of disabilities suffered by students who require services.
While the Rowley child's ability to benefit from public education could
apparently be measured along a continuum directly proportionate to the
level of special services provided, this is not, in fact, typical for many
types of disabling conditions. For many children, educational benefit is
possible only if highly intensive programming is provided. If anything
short of highly intensive programming is provided, the result is not lesser
benefit, but no benefit at all.64 In other words, though school districts
62. The Act only covers children through age 21. Thereafter, though the school
districts' failures remain a societal problem of enormous magnitude, the cost is borne by
entities other than the schools. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
63. See Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993); see also J.L. v.
Francis Howell R-3 Sch. Dist., 693 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Metro.
Nashville & Davidson Cnty. Sch. Sys. v. Guest, 900 F. Supp. 905, 909 (M.D. Tenn.
1995); Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch., 910 F. Supp. 1291, 1305 (E.D. Mich.
1995).
64. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, Inferring
Program Effects for Special Populations: Does Special Education Raise Achievement for
Students with Disabilities?, 84 REv. ECON. & STAT. 584, 592 (2002). Hanushek, Kain,
and Rivkin note in passing:
[T]he effects of special education are very small and statistically insignificant
for students classified as speech-impaired. While speech impairments may
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commonly assert that hey are not required to provide the best
programming, only programming that provides some benefit, parents can
justifiably point out that towing a drowning man halfway to shore is not
a benefit.65 To push the analogy a step further, if there are two drowning
people, but the resources necessary to save only one, towing both
halfway to shore may, in some sense represent fairness or equality, but
no one would claim such an action to be representative of an acceptable
public policy position.
Moreover, the Court's approach in Rowley was inherently
problematic. The drafters of the Act, in addition to recognizing the
moral imperative of protecting the inherent dignity of the disabled child
and the importance of education from a political perspective, clearly
justified the law on the basis of its long-term cost benefits. Arguing that
children in the three- to five-year-old range should be covered by the
Act,66 sponsoring senators acknowledged the states' fiscal concerns, but
asserted: "[W]e feel that it is imperative to point out that the benefits of
early identification and education, both in terms of prevention of future
human tragedy, and in the long-term cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are
so great as to justify continued emphasis upon preschool education for
handicapped children.
67
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions of the lower courts frequently
allow short-term fiscal constraints both to negate the claim that the Act
created a right to education and to trump the long-term cost-benefit
underpinnings of the Act. This approach is based not only on some
unfortunate language in the Rowley decision68 but also on the essential
have adverse effects on reading comprehension (which could spill over into
math achievement for some students), most receive targeted services for
roughly one-half hour per peek, leaving little reason to expect large program
effects for most students with speech impairments.
Id.
65. This is a variation on a sample illustration used by Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 476 (1974) ("[l]f
I am on a desert island, subsisting solely on cocoanuts and oysters and beginning to hate
it a lot, and across the bay from me there is another island, lush and fertile, I do not
improve my position in life by swimming half way across.").
66. Subsequent o its original enactment in 1975, eligibility under the Act has been
repeatedly expanded to cover younger children. See generally Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing
the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1155-57
(2007).
67. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 81 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1479.
The proposed change in eligibility was made in the 1986 amendments to the Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 1145 (1986). See also Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1988).
68. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982). The Supreme Court
quoted the D.C. District Court opinion in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866,
876 (D.D.C. 1972):
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approach to the funding of special education and, for that matter, all
education.
Throughout the course of public education, students move from one
funding stream to the next. As one commentator recently explained:
The IDEA consists of three different funding programs. The main
one, Part B, provides grants to states to support the education of
school-aged children with disabilities. Part C provides smaller grants
to support states' efforts to aid infants and toddlers with disabilities,
and Part D provides other small grants for a variety of national
activities. In recent years, Part B has been funded at around $11.5
billion each year, making the second largest federal education
program, after Title 1. Part C and D toether have recently been
funded approximately $1 billion each year.
Infants and toddlers (birth to three years of age) are potentially covered
by Part C.70  Preschool-aged children (three to five years of age) are
covered under Part B's Preschool Grants Program.7' Upon reaching
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs
that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be
expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a
publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit
therefrom.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
69. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 577, 630 (2013).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 143 1(b) (2012). Section 1431(b) provides the policy:
It is the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance to States--
(1) to develop and implement a statewide, comprehensive, coordinated,
multidisciplinary, interagency system that provides early intervention services
for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families;
(2) to facilitate the coordination of payment for early intervention services from
Federal, State, local, and private sources (including public and private
insurance coverage);
(3) to enhance State capacity to provide quality early intervention services and
expand and improve existing early intervention services being provided to
infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families; and
(4) to encourage States to expand opportunities for children under 3 years of
age who would be at risk of having substantial developmental delay if they did
not receive early intervention services.
Id.
71. Id. § 1419. Regarding preschool grants:
(a) In general
The Secretary shall provide grants under this section to assist States to provide
special education and related services, in accordance with this subchapter--
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2
school age, the responsibility for disabled children's educational
programming and related services shifts to the school district, which
retains that responsibility until age 21.72 Once the child ages out of
public education, if his or her condition is such that further services are
required-for example, if he or she is permanently disabled-Medicaid
or a Medicaid waiver program may take over, though eligibility and
space are limited.73  From the perspective of the pre-school funding
agency and later the school district, there is a financial incentive to move
(1) to children with disabilities aged 3 through 5, inclusive; and
(2) at the State's discretion, to 2-year-old children with disabilities who will
turn 3 during the school year.
(b) Eligibility
A State shall be eligible for a grant under this section if such State--
(1) is eligible under section 1412 of this title to receive a grant under this
subchapter; and
(2) makes a free appropriate public education available to all children with
disabilities, aged 3 through 5, residing in the State.
Id.
72. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) ("A free appropriate public education is available to all
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive,
including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.").
73. See Janice Zalen & Harvey M. Tettlebaum, Restructuring the Medicaid Long-
Term Care System, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 12:3 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2005).
Zalen and Tettlebaum explain:
Congress established the Home and Community Based Services ("HCBS")
waiver program in 1981 to afford states the flexibility to develop and
implement alternatives to facility settings. HCBS waivers are the major
financing mechanism for Medicaid community-based long-term care services,
accounting for 66% of community based benefits. Under the waiver authority,
states are permitted to provide the following services that are not otherwise
covered under Medicaid: case management, homemaker services, home health
aides, personal care services, adult day health, habilitation and respite care.
Other services allowed under the waiver include those that are requested by the
state because beneficiaries needs them to avoid facility placement, such as
transportation, in-home support services, meal services, special communication
services, minor home modifications, and adult day care.
HCBS waiver programs can be organized around specific target population
groups, e.g., people with developmental disabilities or people with traumatic
brain injury; or can be organized around a broader group of beneficiaries such
as the aging/disabilities waiver program. Waiver programs for people who are
aged/have disabilities accounted for over half of waiver participants in 2001,
but for only 21% of waiver program spending. HCBS waiver programs for
persons with mental retardation or developmental disabilities accounted for
only 38% of waiver participants in 2001, but almost three-quarters of waiver
program spending.
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the child through the system to the next funding stream. In other words,
no single entity evaluates the long-term cost of disability or has the
impetus to eliminate or minimize it. All too often, the goal is simply to
spend as little as possible while moving the child into some other
agency's funding stream.74
a. The Early Cases
The early decisions considering cost factors need to be
distinguished from some of the more recent decisions. At first, the
primary issue before the courts in this regard was which services were
educational, and thus within the Act, and which were medical, and thus
arguably excluded. The waters were muddied by the language of the Act
itself that defines a "child with a disability" as "a child"-
(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in
this chapter as "emotional disturbance"), orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related
services.
"Free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") is also defined so as to
include both special education and "related services.' '76  "Related
services" are defined as:
(A) [T]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech-language pathology and
audiology services, interpreting services, psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic
recreation, social work services, school nurse services designed to
enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public
education as described in the individualized education program of the
child, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling,
74. See Elizabeth Burleson, Perspective on Economic Critiques of Disability Law:
The Multifaceted Federal Role in Balancing Equity and Efficiency, 8 IND. HEALTH L.
REv. 335, 349 (2011). Burleson noted:
Investing in education can reduce support cost later on. A given school,
however, does not directly benefit from the costs that are saved in the
individual's adult years. Therefore, there is a lack of local incentive to pay the
price of benefits to other sectors of society in the future.
Id.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
76. Id. § 1401(9).
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orientation and mobility services, and medical services, except that
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education, and includes the early identification and
assessment of disabling conditions in children.
(B) Exception
The term does not include a medical device that is surgically
implanted, or the replacement of such device. 
77
In Detsel v. Board of Education,78 the court considered whether the
Act required the school district to provide skilled nursing care to a child
who suffered from serious, life-threatening medical conditions.79 In
holding that the related services provision did not extend that far, the
court distinguished "related services" covered by the Act from those
which fell into the Act's medical services/devices exception. The court
noted that
[T]he EAHCA does not require the defendant's school district and
board of education to provide a severely physically disabled child
with constant, in-school nursing care. As recognized in the Tatro
decision, the "medical services" exclusion evidences Congress'
concern that schools might otherwise be subjected to excessive costs
and the burden of health care. On the other hand, simple school
nursing services do not similarly burden the schools, and, therefore,
are permissible under [20 U.S.C.] § 1401(17) of the EAHCA. In the
case at bar, the services in question do not fall squarely within the
terms of the "medical services" exclusion because they need not be
performed by a physician, nor do they qualify as simple school
nursing services. See Tatro (finding the CIC a simple procedure
which did not even require the services of a nurse). The extensive,
therapeutic health services sought by the plaintiff on behalf of her
daughter more closely resemble the medical services specifically
excluded by § 1401(17) of the EAHCA. Even though they do not
fulfill the "physician" requirement set forth in [the federal
regulations], the exclusion of the disputed services is in keeping with
its spirit. Furthermore, the Tatro decision does not require the
provision of all health services, regardless of their magnitude, if
performed by one other than a physician. The Supreme Court held
77. Id. § 1401(26)(A)-(B).
78. Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
79. Id. at 1023.
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only that school nursing services of a simple nature are not
excludable as therapeutic "medical services.
8°
The "medical services" limitation, however, soon risked spilling
over to other situations where the services necessary for the provision of
a FAPE, while expensive, could be satisfied by the school districts if they
would pay for private school placements. For example, a half-dozen
years after the enactment of the Act, the Third Circuit decided Kruelle v.
New Castle County School District.8' The case involved a seriously
disabled child who resided in Pennsylvania with his parents.82 In 1978,
with the agreement of both his parents and the relevant educational
authorities in Pennsylvania, he was placed in a 24-hour residential
treatment facility at public expense.83
The family then relocated to Delaware and sought to have him
placed in another residential facility. 84 When the local school authorities
objected, insisting that a day program was sufficient, the parents sought
an administrative hearing under the Act and ultimately appealed to the
federal district court, which ruled in the parents' favor. The school
district brought the case to the Third Circuit.85 After analyzing the Act,
the Court of Appeals concluded:
Admittedly, the unequivocal congressional directive to provide an
appropriate education for all children regardless of the severity of the
handicap ... places a substantial burden on states in certain instances.
The language and the legislative history of the Act simply do not
entertain the possibility that some children may be untrainable. * * *
Under the Education Act ... schools are required to provide a
comprehensive range of services to accommodate a handicapped
child's education needs, regardless of financial and administrative
burdens, and if necessary, to resort to residential placement. The
district court's order, consequently, did not impose a duty beyond the
contemplation of the Education Act; rather it carried out the
implications of an undeniably broad statutory intent.
86
Of course, not all circuits went as far as Kruelle. The First, Second, and
Sixth Circuits appear to have adopted a balancing test under which cost
80. Id. at 1027 (quoting and distinguishing Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984)). CIC is "clean intermittent catheterization." Id.
81. Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d. Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 689.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 690.
86. Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 695-96.
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might be a factor to be taken into consideration, at least if all other
factors are equal.8 7
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of private school placements in
cases where school districts could not or would not provide sufficient
educational opportunity within public school settings was confirmed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Florence County School District Four v.
Carter. In Carter, when the school district failed to offer a FAPE, the
child's parents unilaterally placed their child in a private school and sued
the school district for reimbursement.8 9 Rejecting the school district's
claim that unilateral placement would entail excessive cost, the Court
stated:
The school district also claims that allowing reimbursement for
parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on financially
strapped local educational authorities. The school district argues that
requiring parents to choose a state approved private school if they
want reimbursement is the only meaningful way to allow States to
control costs; otherwise States will have to reimburse dissatisfied
parents for any private school that provides an education that is
proper under the Act, no matter how expensive it may be.
There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant financial
burden on States and school districts that participate in IDEA. Yet
public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents
for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things:
give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting,
or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's
choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform
to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.
90
87. See also Bartlett v. Fairfax Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991)
("Although we agree with plaintiffs that the Board should not make placement decisions
on the basis of financial considerations alone, 'appropriate' does not mean the best
possible education that a school could provide if given access to unlimited funds.");
Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ost
considerations are only relevant when choosing between several options, all of which
offer an 'appropriate' education."); Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 806 (1st Cir. 1982)
(citing Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 112-13 (W.D. Va. 1981)) ("[I]n
determining the 'appropriate' placement of an individual handicapped child, one must
balance the important personal needs of the individual handicapped child, and the
realities of limited public monies."). See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, The Role of
Cost in Educational Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7 (1985); Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, IfAny, May Cost
be a Factor in Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1992).
88. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 15.
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Subsequent amendments to the Act have incorporated the place and
chase procedure, although they have added the requirement that parents
give notice to the school district of their intent to unilaterally place their
child in a private school9' and have added the additional requirement that
parents be advised of their rights to unilateral placement.92 Furthermore,
the 1997 Amendment to the Act limited Carter by adding several
provisos including that parents were not entitled to reimbursement "upon
a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by
the parent. 93 In addition to the statutory limitations, courts have added
the limitation that reimbursement may be denied if the equities of the
situation warrant such an outcome.94
b. More Recent Cases
While the earlier cases sought to achieve some balance between the
long-term cost-benefit goals of the Act and the fiscal constraints faced by
the school districts, more recent decisions and amendments to the Act
have begun to swing toward emphasizing the fiscal constraints faced by
the districts and the perceived inequality to the disabled children's non-
disabled peers.95 Interestingly, courts taking this view appear to reach
their decisions by conflating the reasonable accommodation requirement
of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 96 with the FAPE mandate of the
IDEA.97  For example, recently, in Ridley School District v. MR.,98
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb) (2012).
92. Id. § 1415 (d)(2)(H).
93. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(III).
94. See, e.g., Carmel Central Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. G.P., 373 F. Supp. 2d 402,
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir.
2000)) ("The third prong of Burlington requires the parents to demonstrate that the
equities favor awarding them tuition reimbursement. As noted above, the Second Circuit
has long held that parents who refuse to cooperate with their local [school district
evaluation team] ... equitably forfeit their claim for tuition reimbursement.").
95. See Phillips, supra note 22.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). The relationship between § 504 and IDEA
needs to be addressed for the sake of clarity. In W.B. v. Matula, the court stated:
While IDEA is phrased in terms of a state's affirmative duty to provide a free,
appropriate public education, the Rehabilitation Act is worded as a negative
prohibition against disability discrimination in federally funded programs. The
latter provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). We will refer to this provision as "§ 504."
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parents challenged the school district's choice of a particular reading
program on the basis that its efficacy for children like M.R. had not been
demonstrated. The court observed that "[i]n selecting special education
programs, a school district must be able to take into account not only the
needs of the disabled student, but also the financial and administrative
resources that different programs will require, and the needs of the
school's other non-disabled students."99
The notion that education funding is a zero sum game and thus
money expended to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA must
necessarily be obtained by corresponding reductions in general education
has gained increasing currency within the schools. For example, a 1999
student note observed:
Professional educators and school administrators fault the legally
required rising costs of special education for cuts to general education
funds and services. In Massachusetts, for example, educators
commented that schools are forced to siphon money away from
general education academic expenses to pay for special education
students. In a 1996 report, the Massachusetts Association of School
To establish a violation of § 504, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) E.J. is
disabled as defined by the Act; (2) E.J. is "otherwise qualified" to participate in
school activities; (3) the school or the Board receives federal financial
assistance; and (4) E.J. was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits
of, or subject to discrimination at, the school.
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995). Concerning "reasonable
accommodation," one court explained, "An employee can succeed on a reasonable
accommodation claim under the Rehabilitation Act only if the employee can demonstrate
that a specific reasonable accommodation would have allowed her to perform the
essential functions of her job." Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 232 (3d
Cir. 2000). Why some courts see a "reasonable accommodation" component in the
obligation to provide a FAPE, is something of a mystery. See, e.g., Campbell v. Bd. of
Educ., 58 F. App'x. 162, 166 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Generally, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ('IDEA'), as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-20, informs a
Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim which is buttressed by allegations that a public
school district failed to appropriately accommodate a handicapped student's extraordinary
educational needs.").
98. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260 (3d. Cir. 2012).
99. Id. at 279 (citing J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir.2000)). In
J.D. v. Pawlet School District, the Second Circuit, discussing reasonable accommodation
under the Rehabilitation Act stated:
We have also held that in evaluating the accommodation offered by a
defendant, courts should be "[m]indful of the need to strike a balance between
the rights of [the student and his parents] and the legitimate financial and
administrative concerns of the School District." Rothschild v. Grottenthaler,
907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that requiring school district to
provide sign-language interpreter for deaf parents of student at school-initiated
conferences incident to student's education, but not at voluntary extra-curricular
activities, was "reasonable accommodation").
224 F.3d a't 70-71.
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Superintendents warned that the increased cost of special education is
seriously compromising regular education programs. The same
report showed that money originally budgeted for raising school
standards and creating new general education academic programs
instead is being funneled into special education mandates.
100
It is an attitude widely shared by parents of general education students'
0 '
and, not surprisingly, by more than a few judges and legislators. The
judicial response has been noted. The legislature responded by
amending the Act and, in doing so, further shifting the balance of power
so as to favor the school districts in their dealings with parents of special
education students. 1
0 2
B. Changes in the Act: The Conflict Between Private Contract and
Statutory Guarantees
When the Act was amended in 1997, a number of provisions were
added. For the purposes of this Article, two provisions are of particular
interest: provision for voluntary mediation'0 3 and, more importantly, a
provision specifying that settlement agreements between parents and
school districts were to be formally memorialized. Specifically, the
amendment provided that "[a]n agreement reached by the parties to the
dispute in the mediation process shall be set forth in a written mediation
agreement."'' 0 4 Whatever the intent may have been, the effect was to
undercut the federal guarantee of a free appropriate public education.'
0 5
The reason underlying the decision to provide explicitly for a formal
written settlement agreement between parents and school districts was
not immediately apparent given that under state law procedures,
100. Gregory F. Corbett, Note, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education
Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a General
Education Student's Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 633, 635 (1999).
101. See Phillips, supra note 22.
102. See infra note 105.
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2000). Section 1415(e) provided, in part:
(e) Mediation
(1) In general
Any State educational agency or local educational agency that receives
assistance under this subchapter shall ensure that procedures are established
and implemented to allow parties to disputes involving any matter described in
subsection (b)(6) of this section to resolve such disputes through a mediation
process which, at a minimum, shall be available whenever a hearing is
requested under subsection () or (k) of this section.
Id.
104. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(F).
105. See, e.g., infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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mediation and settlement had previously been possible. On their face,
the 1997 amendments simply codified the existing mediation and
settlement possibility. 1
06
When the Act was amended again in 2004, it added a provision
requiring the parties to attend "resolution conferences"'1 7 and further
specifically provided for the judicial enforceability of any agreement
reached at such a conference.0 8  However, because attorney fees
incurred in connection with mediation or participation in resolution
conferences are generally not recoverable,'0 9 parents were essentially
provided with a disincentive to retaining counsel during the sessions at
which settlement agreements are negotiated."0
To fully understand how the addition of the mediation provisions
changed the legal landscape, it is useful to examine a leading case on
settlement agreements. In 1997, the Third Circuit, in a 2-1 panel
decision, held, in effect, that a settlement agreement between a school
106. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that mediation undercut "the
IDEA's overall focus on due process and parental involvement as guardians of a disabled
child's education." Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mediation
and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L. REv. 333,
337 (2001).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2012).
108. Section 1415(e)(2) further provided for the execution and enforceability of
settlement agreements as follows:
(F) Written agreement
In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the complaint through the
mediation process, the parties shall execute a legally binding agreement that
sets forth such resolution and that--
(i) states that all discussions that occurred during the mediation process shall be
confidential and may not be used as evidence in any subsequent due process
hearing or civil proceeding;
(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative of the agency who has the
authority to bind such agency; and
(iii) is enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district
court of the United States.
Id. § 1415(e)(2).
109. See infra notes 180-181.
110. Not only were the substantive guarantees lost, but the disparities in negotiating
power, which had always favored the school districts, were exacerbated. Perhaps the
largest club wielded by parents in negotiations with school districts was the danger that
they would ultimately prevail and be able to recover attorneys' fees as the prevailing
party. Under the Act, as amended, however, states are given discretion to permit
attorneys' fees for participation in mediation. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) ("Attorneys'
fees may not be awarded relating to any meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is
convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action, or, at the
discretion of the State, for a mediation described in subsection (e).").
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district and a disabled child's parents was enforceable against the parents
and child notwithstanding the fact that its enforcement served to deprive
the child of a FAPE otherwise guaranteed under federal law."1'
The underlying facts were not only simple and straightforward but
also increasingly common in today's world of special education law.
D.R. was a child with multiple disabilities, and his entitlement to special
education services under the IDEA was never in dispute."2 At age four,
he was enrolled in a special education day program near his home.13 By
the end of the 1991-92 school year, his parents became convinced that
the program was not meeting his needs.' 14 They requested that the Board
of Education pay for a private residential placement and, when the Board
refused, sought an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA." 5
In the interim, his parents unilaterally placed him in an out-of-state
residential facility on a trial basis.16 Thereafter, the parents and school
district representatives met at a mediation conference that ultimately
resulted in the execution of a settlement agreement."' Under its terms,
the District agreed to pay a pro-rated portion of the residential center's
annual tuition of $27,500 for the current and following school year plus
90 percent of any increase in tuition for the second year." 8
During the 1991-92 school year, the residential center provided one-
on-one aides necessary for D.R. to function. 19 At some point, however,
the school determined that it could not continue to provide one-on-one
assistants at the existing tuition rate. 20 Therefore, the parents (and
subsequently the school district) were advised that two personal aides
would be required for an additional cost of $16,640 per aide.'21 In other
words, the cost of keeping D.R. at the residential center more than
doubled, increasing from $27,500 in 1991-92 to $62,487 for the 1992-93
school year.
The case eventually made its way to the federal district court, which
"concluded that New Jersey could not refuse to provide educationally
necessary services... [since such] services are the right of the disabled
111. D.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 898 (3d Cir. 1997).









121. D.R., 109 F.3d. at 899.
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individual and cannot be waived by a contract to provide something
less.122
Disagreeing, the Third Circuit reasoned:
Once a school board and the parents of a disabled child finalize a
settlement agreement and the board agrees to pay a certain portion of
the school fees, the parents should not be allowed to void the
agreement merely because the total cost of the program subsequently
increases. A party enters a settlement agreement, at least in part, to
avoid unpredictable costs of litigation in favor of agreeing to known
costs. Government entities have additional interests in settling
disputes in order to increase the predictability of costs for budgetary
123purposes.
Going on to note "the federal policy of encouraging settlement
agreements," in that they "promote the amicable resolution of disputes
and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by courts,"124 the
majority enforced the agreement and entered summary judgment in favor
of the district. 1
25
The dissent, on the other hand, apparently was not persuaded that
the certainties of state budgeting or reduction in the courts' work load
justified the outcome, noting agreement with the district court that "held
that IDEA creates certain rights to education assistance that cannot be
waived by the guardians of a handicapped child and certain duties that
cannot be bargained away by school boards."
'1 26
In other words, according to the majority, settlements arrived at
through the Act's mediation process were not to be controlled by the
substantive requirements of the Act itself. Specifically, parents and
school districts could enter into enforceable agreements even if the
agreements did not result in the provision of a free, appropriate public
education otherwise mandated by law. 27 Moreover, other substantive
guarantees under the Act-notably the pendency requirement-
apparently were now subordinated to private agreement. 
28
Traditionally the threat of public litigation and both the monetary
and reputational risks it entailed for the school district gave parents some
122. Id. at 900.
123. Id. at 901.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 902.
126. D.R., 109 F.3d. at 902.
127. Id.; see also Ballard ex rel. Ballard v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 273 F. App'x. 184, 188
(3d Cir. 2008) ("A parent can waive her child's right to a FAPE. The fact that Ms.
Ballard entered into a settlement agreement, which she now contends falls short of
providing her daughter with a FAPE, does not inherently violate law or public policy.").
128. See infra text at notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
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leverage, though commentators agreed that parents were at a distinct
disadvantage in dealing with the school.129 If a parent's statutory rights
can be waived, the parents' disadvantage is magnified.'3° Professor
Marchese explained:
[C]onflict may be necessary to induce the parties, particularly the
school district, to adopt more reasonable positions. Where there is a
power imbalance, information inequities, and an unwillingness of the
parties to compromise, the availability of voluntary mediation does
little to add to the process. This is not meant to suggest hat children
whose families contest their placements through due process hearings
always end up with more "appropriate" placements than with
mediations. Rather, in the guise of a more flexible, collaborative
approach, the IDEA drafters may have inadvertently made it easier
for school districts to win concessions from parents that they
normally would not be able to obtain at due process hearings.
Although the legalistic approach, as exemplified by the due process
hearing, often results in more formalized relationships and an
emphasis on rights to the possible exclusion of other important
concerns, the threat of conflict and the costs it would impose keep the
focus on the underlying statutory goals.'
3'
In light of the 1997 and 2004 amendments to the Act, however, the
argument that the settlement agreement should not be enforceable
because it violates the public policy set forth elsewhere in the Act loses
some of its force. After all, since the Act specifically provides for an
alternative dispute resolution process and further provides for the judicial
enforceability of agreements reached either through mediation or at the
129. Compare Marchese, supra note 106, at 350-51 (observing that in mediation lies
"[t]he danger [of yielding] . . . results that are unfair to the very people the IDEA was
designed to empower"), with Damon Huss, Balancing Acts: Dispute Resolution in U.S.
and English Special Education Law, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 347, 359
(2003) (expressing the opinion that mediation "nurtures and protects positive
relationships between parents and the educational authorities").
130. See Chopp, supra note 15, at 449-60. In the course of discussing the factors
that slant the balance of negotiating power in favor of the districts, Professor Chopp notes
parents' lack of access to legal counsel and school districts' liability insurance. In other
words, disparities in resources coupled with the congressional refusal to fully fund
special education, has created a situation in which "it is difficult to conceive how
disabled students will receive the full guarantee of FAPE." Id. at 460; see also Sonja
Kerr & Jenai St. Hill, Mediation of Special Education Disputes in Pennsylvania, 15 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 179, 188 (2012) (arguing that "[u]nsympathetic courts coupled
with the prominence of a power imbalance between [parents and school districts] . . .
results in unfair settlements"); Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a
Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 61 (1997) (expressing concern about parent-school district disparities
of power in the absence of legal representation); Phillips, supra note 22, at 1828-29
(discussing the limitations on effective parental advocacy).
131. Marchese, supra note 106, at 357.
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resolution conference, it is hard to determine which of the multiple
policies underlying the law should be enforced when the provisions
conflict. Though it may seem obvious that the procedural provisions
should not be permitted to negate the Act's primary substantive goal, a
number of cases allowing parental waiver of a child's right to a FAPE
would seem, on balance, to indicate where the law is going.
1 32
In any event, the Third Circuit's decision to elevate contract right
over rights granted to parents and disabled children under the Act gave
school districts an even stronger negotiating position. Not only was the
basic promise of a substantively "appropriate" education subordinated,
but school districts took the position that other provisions intended to
protect children from school district attempts to evade the letter and spirit
of the Act could also be compromised.13 3 Thus, it has become common
for school districts to demand that parents waive the provisions of the
"stay put" provision in return for the agreement to place children in
private schools for a year or two. 134  Previously, under the Act as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burlington School Committee
v. Department of Education,135 if a district agreed to place a child in a
private school, that would become the pendent placement. As such, the
school district would be obligated to continue to pay for it until such time
as the parties agreed otherwise or, following the legal processes set forth
by the Act, a court upheld the school district's decision to place the child
in another program.a6  Once pendency has been waived, however,
school districts can and do stop paying for the private placements as soon
as the contract term expires. This forces parents to initiate due process
while unilaterally paying for the previously agreed-upon program in
addition to repeatedly paying for the attorney fees associated with these
disputes. 137
132. See D.B.A. ex rel. Snerling v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 10-1045
(PAM/FLN), 2010 WL 5300946, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2010) (concluding that
settlement agreements were enforceable); Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 239
(D. Conn. 2000) (upholding agreement); E.D. ex rel. Dukes v. Enterprise City Bd. of
Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1269 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (enforcing agreement, but
examining terms to determine whether FAPE was denied as a consequence); see also
Mark C. Weber, Settling Individuals With Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up
Is Hard To Do, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 641, 654 (2010) (noting that "[q]uestions exist
about courts' jurisdiction to enforce settlements").
133. See, e.g., I.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 2d 674, 692 (E.D. Pa.
2013) (finding that parents were estopped to assert their child's right to a FAPE even in
the absence of a valid settlement agreement).
134. Copies of settlement agreements on file with author.
135. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
136. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137. The imbalance of power in the negotiating process is exacerbated by the fact
that school districts are routinely covered by "due process defense insurance" covering
not only the cost of out-of-district placements, but also their attorney's fees (less the
[Vol. 119:2
2014] DISTRUST AND DISCLOSURE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 517
C. The Emergence of the Perception of Parental Greed
The initial legislative decision to utilize a legalist model in
structuring the Act was based on the widespread perception that not only
were disabled children being denied educational opportunity, but that
parents were largely powerless in their attempts to deal with the
educational establishment on the child's behalf. By providing both rights
and legal processes to enforce those rights, the earlier unfairness could be
rectified. As the progressive impulses that characterized legal change
during the 1970s and early part of the 1980s faded, however, the public
perception of those who sought to utilize the legal system to redress
rights changed.
1 38
The changes were reflected both in judicial interpretation and in
legislative amendment aimed at limiting the power that earlier had been
granted. Utilizing the approach that had proven so successful in tort
reform, the primary target was legal representation. There are at least
two primary ways to limit legal representation. First, if damages can be
capped or eliminated altogether, the incentive to represent those unable
to afford representation will be reduced. Second, if restrictions can be
placed on the availability of statutory attorneys' fees to parents who
prevail, it will inevitably reduce the number of attorneys willing to
assume representation. Both approaches have been successfully
implemented in special education litigation.
1. Limiting Damages
It is undisputed that claims under both the IDEA and § 504139_
failure to provide a FAPE and discrimination on the basis that a FAPE
policy-specified deductible) and liability for the parents' attorneys' fees, if any are
recovered. See Chopp, supra note 15, at 453-57; see also EL DORADO COUNTY OFF.
EDUC., www.edcoe.org// (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); Memorandum from Robert J.
Kretzmer, Dir., Kern Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., to District Superintendents et al.
(Mar. 16, 2013), available at http://sisc.kem.org/pl/wp-files/pl/2013/04/SEVCP-Annual-
district-signup.pdf. The memo describes a California self-insurance program covering:
up to an aggregate of $75,000 of legal fees and of costs insured during each
fiscal year... in the defense of due process claims resulting from the filling of
due process complaint(s)[;] . . . legal fees ... up to a maximum hourly rate of
S150.00[;] [flees for expert witnesses . . . up to a maximum hourly rate of
$125.00.
Id.
138. See, e.g., Renae Waterman Groeschel, Discipline and the Disabled Student:
The IDEA Reauthorization Responds, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1085, 1096 ("[O]f all the federal
regulatory statutes in the United States, the IDEA ranks fourth in the amount of litigation
it generates. According to the Director of Special Education for Montgomery County,
Maryland public schools, 'Special education has become an ambulance-and the lawyers
are chasing it."').
139. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
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was not provided--can be brought simultaneously.140 However, whether
one could bring a claim for damages under § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act 141 in addition to a claim under IDEA has been the subject of much
litigation, resulting in a split among the circuits. The Third Circuit's
treatment of the issue is instructive. In the 1995 case WB. v. Matula,
142
the court held that the IDEA was not an exclusive remedy and a § 1983
claim could also be brought. The court concluded:
[T]he traditional presumption in favor of all appropriate relief is not
rebutted as to § 1983 actions to enforce IDEA. Defendants have
identified no "clear direction" in the text or history of IDEA
indicating such a limitation, and indeed there is strong suggestion that
Congress intended no such restriction. Certainly the plain language
of § 1983 authorizes actions at law or equity, and our prior holding in
Diamond compels the conclusion that, as a matter of law, an
aggrieved parent or disabled child is not barred from seeking
monetary damages in such an action.
43
A dozen years later, however, in A. W. v. Jersey City Public School,144 the
Third Circuit reconsidered the issue and concluded that
§ 1983 actions were not available for redress of violations of the IDEA,
holding:
The IDEA includes a judicial remedy for violations of any right
"relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
[a] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to
such child." § 1415(b)(6). Given this comprehensive scheme,
Congress did not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations
of the IDEA such as those alleged by A.W.
145
140. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2013) (interpreting § 504 and requiring that "[a]
recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program or activity
shall provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped person
who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's
handicap").
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
142. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484,494 (3d Cir. 1995).
143. Id. at 495 (referring to Board of Education v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
1986)).
144. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d. Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 803. The court made a somewhat subtle distinction between the use of §
1983 to remedy violations of the IDEA and the use of § 1983 to vindicate other rights
arising in the parent-school relationship. In other words, § 1983 allows a remedy for
violation of rights arising under the Constitution or federal statute. The former are
actionable, rights arising out of the IDEA are not. The court noted:
By preserving rights and remedies "under the Constitution," section 1415 [()]
does permit plaintiffs to resort to section 1983 for constitutional violations,
notwithstanding the similarity of such claims to those stated directly under
IDEA. But section 1415[()] does not permit plaintiffs to sue under section
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A majority of the Federal Courts of Appeal have agreed with the
Third Circuit,146 and at last count, only the Seventh1 47 and Second
Circuits1 48 have continued to permit the use of damage remedies
available under § 1983 to redress violations of the IDEA. If a particular
jurisdiction were to follow the minority position, an interesting collateral
issue involving the validity of an agreement purporting to waive a child's
right to a FAPE arises. In Somoza v. New York City Department of
Education,1 49 the court stated:
Notwithstanding the general enforceability of agreements settling
IDEA claims, a court confronted with questions regarding the validity
of such an agreement must take into account that it involves the
waiver of a vital civil right. Recognizing this essential interest, the
Third Circuit has held that the standards applicable to reviewing the
validity of a waiver of a civil rights claim, rather than general
contract principles, apply to the interpretation of a settlement of
claims under the IDEA. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that a waiver of IDEA claims must be "knowing
and voluntary" as judged by the "totality of the circumstances."). 1
50
In any event, assuming that the plaintiff does have independent
constitutional or other federal or state law claims against the school
district, there still remains the question of whether one is required to
exhaust the administrative procedures established by the Act as a
condition to pursuing those claims. In that context, courts have
disagreed on the extent to which and the circumstances under which
1983 for an IDEA violation, which is statutory in nature. Nothing in section
1415 [(1)] overrules the Court's decision in Smith to the extent it held that
Congress intended IDEA to provide the sole remedies for violations of that
same statute.
Id. at 798 (citing Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1998)).
146. See generally Sarah Kaltsounis, Cause of Action for Violation of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (1DEIA) [20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et
seq.], in 37 CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES 447 (2008) (collecting cases through
2013).
147. Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1997).
148. Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
149. Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd
on other grounds, 538 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2008). In Matula, the court named the following
five factors to be considered in assessing whether under the "totality of the
circumstances" an IDEA claim waiver was given voluntarily and knowingly:
[W]hether (1) the language of the agreement was clear and specific; (2) the
consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeded the relief to which the
signer was already entitled by law; (3) the signer was represented by counsel;
(4) the signer received an adequate explanation of the document; (5) the signer
had time to reflect upon it; and (6) the signer understood its nature and scope.
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
150. Somoza, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88.
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exhaustion is required prior to filing the independent federal or state law
claims.
In Matula, the court of appeals held that exhaustion was not
required because either a § 1983 action seeking damages involves a type
of relief that is not available under the IDEA or because exhaustion
would be futile.' 51 Courts, however, continue to express disagreement.
A comparison of two federal cases out of Pennsylvania is instructive. In
Vicky M v. Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19,152 the court
permitted an action for monetary damages under § 1983, breach of
fiduciary duty, common-law assault and battery, and so on, finding that
administrative remedies under the IDEA need not be exhausted because
of the futility exception.15 3 The court reasoned:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, excusing failure to exhaust based
on the futility exception, has held that "where the relief sought in a
civil action is not available in IDEA administrative proceedings,
recourse to such proceedings would be futile and the exhaustion
requirement is excused." In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals looked first to the language of the statute itself. The IDEA
states that "before the filing of a civil action under such laws ...
seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the
procedures under subsection (f) and (g) of this section shall be
exhausted... ." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(/) (emphasis added). Recognizing
that damages are available under section 1983, but not under the
IDEA administrative procedures, the Matula court then concluded
that "by its plain terms [this section] does not require exhaustion
where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative
proceeding. 1
54
While a challenge to the contents of an IEP would require exhaustion
of administrative remedies-since school administrators are in the
best position to establish appropriate educational programs-
exhaustion of administrative remedies when a plaintiff is challenging
only a failure to implement an IEP would prove fruitless. 1
55
In contrast, in Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media School District,'56 the
court rejected both the argument that an action seeking only damages
151. Matula, 67 F.3d at 496.
152. Vicky M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437 (M.D. Pa.
2007).
153. VickyM,486F. Supp. 2d at 453-54.
154. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
156. Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., No. 11-6733, 2013 WL 1776076
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013).
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took the case outside of the exhaustion requirement as well as the claim
that a district's failure to implement a program that was previously
agreed upon made the exhaustion requirement futile. 57 In Batchelor, the
plaintiff alleged that an IEP was developed.58  In response to the
mother's complaints that the IEP was not being implemented, the parties
entered into a settlement agreement "which provided [the student] with
compensatory education services."'59  Allegedly, the district "did not
implement the Settlement Agreement, [but] ... engaged in retaliatory
acts.' 60  In response, the mother hired a private tutor and filed suit
seeking reimbursement, a portion of which was paid.'
6'
The action alleged a failure to provide a FAPE; retaliation in
violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; 162 and state law claims for
breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.163 Defendant's motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust
administrative remedies was granted by a federal magistrate on the basis
that relief in the form of compensatory education was available through
the administrative process, even though plaintiffs complaint did not seek
such relief, but only sought monetary damages. 64
Upholding the magistrate's decision, the court reasoned:
Although a Rule 12(b)(1) motion restricts a court's review to the
documents before it, substantive issues raised within a court's
jurisdictional review may require a consideration of relief beyond
what a plaintiff requests. This is especially true in cases such as the
one at bar, where Plaintiffs claims they are excused from exhausting
the IDEA administrative process, which will dictate whether a court
has jurisdiction. When analyzing whether a plaintiff is excused from
exhausting its claims, courts will often consider whether the
administrative process can provide a plaintiff relief. This is so
because the availability of certain relief under the administrative
process, including that of compensatory education, may divest a
157. Id. at *7-8.




162. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
163. Batchelor, 2013 WL 1776076, at *1.
164. Id. Whether one can enforce a settlement in court without going through
administrative due process is unclear. There was authority that one need not further
exhaust administrative procedures in cases of noncompliance with an agreement even
prior to the 2004 Amendments to the Act. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. v. M.C., 796 So. 2d 581,
583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also Weber, supra note 132, at 654 (arguing that
"[t]he absence of any mention of an exhaustion requirement implies that if the opposing
party violates a settlement agreement reach at either [a mediation or resolution session]..
•, direct enforcement will be available, and exhaustion through a due process hearing will
not be necessary").
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federal court of jurisdiction. Therefore, when a plaintiff is asserting
it is excused from exhaustion and the court is analyzing whether it
has jurisdiction under the IDEA based upon the pleadings, the court
may consider whether compensatory education is available to a
plaintiff-even absent a request for such relief.1
65
As to the futility argument based on the district's non-compliance with
settlement agreements entered into in the past, the court was similarly
unsympathetic, reasoning that:
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the District's previous
noncompliance with prior settlement agreements renders
compensatory education inappropriate, this argument is unpersuasive.
In the IDEA context, courts generally find that prior inadequate
relations between parties do not foreclose or make futile similar relief
in the future. This is true even where prior settlement agreements are
at issue.
166
The plaintiffs attempted distinction between the creation of an IEP and
its implementation was also rejected.167 Finally, the court distinguished
Vicky M, asserting:
Plaintiffs rely on Vicky M, a Middle District case excusing
exhaustion where the plaintiff, an autistic child, challenged IEP
restraint techniques implemented in a physically abusive manner.
Outside of seeking damages for the physical abuse, however, the
plaintiffs presented no other educational issues for resolution.
Conversely, Plaintiffs' allegations here question the adequacy of
tutoring the District implemented, an educational source the
administrative process may resolve. 1
68
In short, the once prevailing view that the IDEA created a federal
substantive right, the deprivation of which provided the basis for a
damages claim under the federal Civil Rights Act, has now been rejected
by a clear majority of the circuits. While independent federal or federal
constitutional rights may form the basis of a § 1983 suit and state law
claims may be actionable, administrative exhaustion rules and limitations
on the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement have become
major hurdles to a claim for monetary damages.
165. Batchelor, 2013 WL 1776076, at *4 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at *9.
168. Id. at *9 n.9.
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2. Claims for Monetary Reimbursement for Private Placement
As noted earlier, parents facing a school district placement offer that
they believe is inappropriate even under the marginal Rowley standard
can place their child privately and then pursue a claim against the
educational agency seeking reimbursement for the monies expended.1
69
Such a claim, arguably, is more in the nature of an action for restitution
than a claim for damages, though courts have been less than receptive to
this characterization.1 70  Nevertheless, there are both practical and
technical legal limitations. First, the option is only open to those who
could at least initially afford to pay private tuition while seeking a
determination of the underlying legal and factual issues. Second, the
parents must be able to prevail on the merits by demonstrating that the
IEP offered by the school district did not constitute a FAPE and that the
private placement unilaterally chosen by them was appropriate. In other
words, the parents have to both pay and prove that they were right and
the school district was wrong.1
71
169. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1408-09 (7th Cir. 1985). The
court reasoned:
Calling what they are asking for "restitution" does not strengthen the plaintiffs'
case. Indeed, since restitution, being measured by the wrongdoer's profit rather
than the victim's loss, can result in a larger money judgment than damages, and
partly for this reason is often reserved for the more serious types of
wrongdoing, it is even less likely that Congress intended to subject the states to
open-ended liability in suits for restitution than to make them subject o suits
for damages. The plaintiffs' second and third points we reject. Restitution in
the only sense in which it might be thought to add a moral weight to the plea
for reimbursement refers to the situation where the defendant has been unjustly
enriched at the plaintiffs expense. That might be the situation here if Illinois
had taken the plaintiffs' money and used it for some activity unrelated to the
needs of handicapped children. But there is no argument that anything of this
sort has occurred. So far as appears, any money that the state saved by not
fully reimbursing the parents of handicapped children has gone into programs
for the benefit of those children.
Id. (internal citations omitted). While it is true that restitution is often associated with
wrongdoing, it is not generally thought to be a requirement. If the educational entity was
unjustly enriched by its improper retention of funds that it was under a duty to use for the
claimant, restitution (measured by the defendant's gain) was an appropriate remedy. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 22 cmt. h, illus. 16 (2011).
171. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246-47 (2009). The Court
explained:
Parents "are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both
that the public placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was
proper under the Act." And even then courts retain discretion to reduce the
amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant-for instance, if
the parents failed to give the school district adequate notice of their intent to
enroll the child in private school. In considering the equities, courts should
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One would think that the best way for parents to demonstrate that
they were right would be to compare the child's pre-placement testing
with the child's test scores after some reasonable period of participation
in the private placement, thereby showing relatively rapid progress.
Particularly if the district's IEP had called for a continuation of a
program that was not getting very good results, marked improvement
should be, if not dispositive, at least a strong indication that, from an
educational standpoint, the private placement was the better choice for
that child.
Unfortunately, however, the courts have not seen it that way. In
Roland M v. Concord School Committee,172 the court held that the
"appropriateness" of an IEP offered by the educational agency had to be
judged based on the information available and at the point in time when
it was offered, not in hindsight. 173 Therefore, particularly if the child had
not been put in a district program and allowed to fail, it became
exceedingly difficult to show that the IEP was inappropriate when
offered. Even dramatic improvement in a private placement only
showed that it was also appropriate.174 To make matters worse, courts
have held that the program being offered by the district did not have to
actually exist to be appropriate. 175 The fact that parents could not
observe the class to see how it was run and judge how well it would meet
generally presume that public-school officials are properly performing their
obligations under IDEA.
Id. (citation omitted). Actually, until the Court decided Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49, 57-58 (2005) (holding that "[a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress
intended otherwise ... the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party
seeking relief'), it was widely believed that the burden was on the school district to
defend the program that they had offered. See, e.g., Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Charles
M.F., No. CIV. 92-609-M, 1994 WL 485754, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1994).
172. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 912 (1991).
173. Id. at 992 (asserting "[a]n IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for
'appropriateness,' an IEP must take into account what was, and was not, objectively
reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the time the IEP was promulgated.");
accord Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999); Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover
Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d Cir. 1993). But see Marc M. ex rel. Aldan M. v.
Dep't of Educ., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1244 n.2 (D. Haw. 2011) (interpreting the Ninth
Circuit's position as assessing appropriateness at the time of implementation of the IEP,
not at the time of promulgation).
174. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993). The court
reasoned:
This IEP is aimed at addressing the particular disabilities from which appellant
suffers. While the Brehm School undoubtedly can provide superior services
aimed exclusively at helping learning-disabled children such as appellant, this
is not what the Act requires. This is especially true where, as here, "the IEP
was never given a chance to succeed."
Id. (citation omitted).
175. Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1093.
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their child's needs will not necessarily prevent it from being deemed an
appropriate placement. 176
Even if one persuaded a hearing officer that the district's proposed
placement was not appropriate and further demonstrated that the parent's
selected placement was appropriate, the hearing officer and ultimately
the court would still have to find that the equities of the situation favored
a right to reimbursement. 177  The 1997 Amendments to the Act, in
addition to requiring parents to give notice of their intent to privately
place the child, 78 specified that reimbursement was not available "upon
a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by
the parents.'79
Given the odds of winning with such a stacked deck, the fact that
attorneys frequently counsel settlement, even if that means waiving the
stay put rule or accepting less than the payment of full tuition, is hardly
surprising.1
80
3. Changing the Standard for Recovery of Attorneys' Fees
As mentioned above, the 1997 and 2004 Amendments contain a
number of provisions related to the recovery of attorneys' fees. While a
full catalogue is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
fees are probably not recoverable for mediation'81 and are clearly not
recoverable for resolution conferences182 or "relating to any meeting of
the IEP Team.' 83 A district may make an offer of compromise resulting
in fee shifting if the parents fail to do better at hearing.184 If a parent's
complaint is found "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," the
state or educational agency can recover fees. 1
85
Perhaps more importantly, however, in the 2001 case Buckhannon
Board and Care Home, Inc v. West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources,186 the Court held that the "prevailing party" language
176. Id.
177. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(J)(aa)-(bb) (2012).
179. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III).
180. Keep in mind that the cost of losing is not only private school tuition, but also
attorneys' fees. To make matters worse, under the 2004 revisions to the Act, there is the
risk of being held liable for the school district's attorneys' fees as well. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(III); see infra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
182. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii)(I)-(I).
183. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
184. Id. § 1415 (i)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(III).
185. See supra note 180.
186. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001).
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in various federal attorneys' fees statutes did not include "a party that has
failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent
decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct."'
' 87
Although Buckhannon did not arise under the IDEA, because
federal attorneys' fees statutes are normally interpreted consistently
across different federal claims,118 it is not surprising that federal courts of
appeal1 89 and district courts9° have found the "prevailing party"
approach of Buckhannon to be applicable in IDEA cases. For example,
in John T v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit,'91 plaintiff's counsel
was successful in obtaining and enforcing a preliminary injunction. The
case settled after the Intermediate Unit ("IU") agreed to a new IEP.
Nevertheless, the court held that plaintiff was not the prevailing party
within the meaning of Buckhannon.192 Apparently, the federal policy of
promoting settlement has its limits. 1
93
II. FULL DISCLOSURE AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION
A. The Duty to Disclose: In General
At one extreme, particularly prior to the early years of the twentieth
century, it was not uncommon for courts to find there was a lack of any
disclosure obligation between the parties to a transaction. In the context
of sales, this lack of any duty to disclose was captured by the Latin
phrase, caveat emptor or let the buyer beware. Knowledgeable parties to
a transaction, usually sellers, were free to trade on their knowledge when
dealing with the ignorant. Tort liability for common-law deceit, like
most tort causes of action, required an act by the defendant; mere silence,
187. Id. at 600.
188. Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys'
Fees: Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 519, 520
(2003); Mark C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
After Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 373 (2004).
189. See, e.g., Doe v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 26 (1 st'Cir. 2004); John T. v. Del.
Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist.
No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 2003); J.C v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 123
(2d Cir. 2002).
190. Antonio ex rel. Mother v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 314 F. Supp. 2d 95, 98 (D. Mass.
2004); Nathan F. ex rel. Harry F. v. Parkland Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 03-4714, 2004 WL
906219, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2004).
191. John. T. v Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003).
192. - Id. at 561.
193. Cf supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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a form of nonfeasance, was not actionable.194  Moreover, attempts to
rescind agreements based on nondisclosure were likely to be of no avail
given that rescission typically required fraud or, at the very least, mutual
mistake.'95 In the absence of a duty to speak, silence could not constitute
fraud.
196
Of course, many of these old cases arose in the context of land sale
contracts in nineteenth century America, at a time when free market
capitalism was at its peak. As one historian explained:
It is nineteenth century America, however, which provided the real
impetus for caveat emptor's effect on American law. Government
was viewed as a promoter of enterprise (e.g., to provide public goods
such as transport, currency, and credit) and not as a paternalistic
protector which could impede enterprise. "[T]he Common Law
allows parties to make their own bargains, and when they are made,
holds them to a strict compliance .... ",197
In the context of the sale of goods, the rule was not as stringent.
198
Warranty of merchantability-at least that the subject matter of the
contract was what it purported to be-began to emerge by the early
nineteenth century.199 Nevertheless, at least in cases where the seller had
194. An insured's obligation to disclose in the case of marine insurance
constituted a notable exception to the general rule. In those cases, an insured is held to
the standard of uberrimae fidei (the utmost fidelity). As explained by the court in St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Halifax Trawlers, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 232, 240
(D. Mass. 2007), under the doctrine:
[I]t does not matter whether [the insured] omitted the information on the basis
of neglect, ignorance or malice. If the information is material, it must be
disclosed. Though the notion of materiality is subjective by nature, it has been
defined in these circumstances as "that which can possibly influence the mind
of a prudent and intelligent insurer in determining whether it will accept the
risk."
See also infra note 207 and accompanying text.
195. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).
196. Doe v. Town of Boume, No. Civ.A.02-11363-DPW, 2004 WL 1212075, at *11
(D. Mass. May, 28 2004) (noting that the school had no duty to disclose the child's rape
to the parents).
197. See generally Susan Roger Fineran, Knowing Silence of Nonentrepreneurial
Information is not Sporting, 59 ALBANY L. REv. 511, 520 n.ll (1995) (quoting
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 158, 202, 233 (1973)).
198. Anthony J. Vlatas, An Economic Analysis of Implied Warranties of Fitness in
Commercial Leases, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 658, 661 (1994). Vlatas explains:
[T]he caveat emptor doctrine-ascendant in the United States during much of
the 19th century-continued to govern the default allocation of legal
responsibility for the leasehold's fitness even as courts began to abandon rules
based on caveat emptor in the contract context, most notably with respect to
sales of goods.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
199. See Gardiner v. Gray, (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B.); 4 Camp. 144, 145.
Lord Ellenborough famously asserted:
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superior knowledge, using that knowledge to gain advantage appears to
have been legally sanctioned and was arguably socially acceptable.200
By the early to mid 1930s, when the Restatements of Torts,2°1
202 . 203Contracts, and Restitution were published, courts had come to
recognize the existence of an obligation to disclose. Leaving aside
momentarily the obligations that arise out of fiduciary relationships,
courts had come to reject the existence of a privilege not to disclose in a
variety of circumstances. Thus, for example, the Restatement of
Contracts acknowledged that the expression of opinion, normally not
actionable, may become so if the opinion is offered by "one who has, or
purports to have, expert knowledge of the matter .... ,,204  Moreover,
comment b to § 8 of the Restatement of Restitution, states the general
proposition that "[e]xcept in a few special types of transactions, such as
insurance contracts and transactions between a fiduciary and his
beneficiary, there is no general duty upon a party to a transaction to
disclose facts to the other party."20 5  Comment b goes on to state the
exception in cases where
a person who, before the transaction is completed, knows or suspects
that the other is acting under a misapprehension which, if the mistake
were mutual, would cause the transaction to be voidable, is under a
duty to disclose the facts to the other. So, too, if one who has made a
statement which was true at the time of speaking discovers that it is
[T]he purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering the
description in the contract. Without any particular warranty, this is an implied
term in every such contract. Where there is no opportunity to inspect the
commodity, the maxim of caveat emptor does not apply. He cannot without a
warranty insist that it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, but the
intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the
market under the denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill.
Id.
200. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose
Information: Lessons Learned from the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
79, 126 (2008). Johnson notes that
For several hundred years, and right up to the last few decades, caveat emptor
was the staple fare of the law of real estate purchases, at least for buildings
already constructed. The purchaser was deemed perfectly capable of inspecting
the property and deciding for himself whether he wanted it, and if anyone were
foolish enough to buy a pig in a poke, he deserved what he got. Short of
outright fraud that would mislead the buyer, the seller had no duties to disclose
anything at all.
Id.
201. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1934).
202. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932).
203. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937).
204. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 474 (1932).
205. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 8 cmt. b (1937).
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untrue with reference to present facts or if he discovers that a
statement which was immaterial when made has become material, he
is under a duty of disclosure.
206
The relative availability of knowledge (or the existence of a statute) may
serve to impose a disclosure obligation under circumstances where it
might not otherwise exist. Thus, for example, there has long been an
exception to the general rule of nondisclosure that imposes on an
insured the obligation to disclose facts to an insurer during the
application stage of the creation of an insurance contract-particularly in
the case of marine insurance
207
By 1977, when § 551 of the Second Restatement of Torts was
published, the rule had evolved into the following:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may
justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business
transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he
had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to
disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise
reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
206. Id.
207. Initially, the obligation to disclose arose in cases of the negotiation of an
insurance contract in cases of marine insurance when ships and their cargo were far away
from the underwriters and inspection and confirmation of the truth of an insureds'
representations were, as a practical matter, simply not feasible. See Compagnie de
Reassurance d'Ile de Fr. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D.
Mass. 1996) (explaining the origin of the rule).
To deal with such problems, courts created the obligation of uberrimaefidei (the
highest degree of good faith) making rescission possible in cases of non-disclosure
provided the fact not disclosed "materially affect[ed] the risk being insured" regardless of
the existence or non-existence of scienter on the part of the insured. See N.Y. Marine &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tradeline (L.L.C.), 266 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 2001). Later, the rule was
expanded to create a duty to disclose and corresponding remedy of rescission in some
non-marine cases at least when disclosure was statutorily required. See, e.g., Great Am.
Ins. Co. v. Wexler Ins. Agency, Inc., No. CV97-9397 MMM (BQRX), 2000 WL 290380,
at *13 n.9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2000). The court asserted:
The doctrine of uberrimnae fidei imposes duties on the parties to an inland
marine insurance contract. See California Insurance Code § 1900. Since, as a
fiduciary, an inland marine agent must fully disclose all material facts, it is
logical to define the breadth of the agent's disclosure duty by looking to the
duty imposed on parties to the insurance contract, i.e., if an applicant for inland
marine insurance must disclose all material facts regarding the risk, an agent's
duty of disclosure must be at least as broad. The court need not resolve
whether the doctrine of uberrimae fidei applies directly to an inland marine
agent, however, because general agency principles impose similar duties of full
disclosure and the highest good faith.
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reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent
his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading; and
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make
untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was
true or believed to be so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation ot made with the expectation that it
would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about
to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of
the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts.
208
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977); see also W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 106 (5th ed. 1984)
(observing that "there has been a rather amorphous tendency on the part of most courts in
recent years to find a duty of disclosure when the circumstances are such that the failure
to disclose something would violate a standard requiring conformity to what the ordinary
ethical person would have disclosed"). Keeton et al. put forth eight factors for
consideration, summarized as follows:
(1) The difference in the levels of the parties' sophistication regarding the
subject matter of the contract;
(2) The relationship between the parties;
(3) "The manner in which the information is acquired. Information ... may
[be] acquired by chance, by effort, or by an illegal act";
(4) The nature of the undisclosed fact. In contracts of sale of real property, if
the vendor conceals an intrinsic defect not discoverable by reasonable care, the
court will be more prone to find a duty to disclose than it would be to find a
duty to disclose an extrinsic fact;
(5) The contracting position of the parties relative to each other. "It is much
more likely that a seller will be required to disclose information than a
purchaser";
(6) The nature of the contract. All material facts generally must be disclosed in
releases and contracts of insurance;
(7) The importance of the nondisclosed fact to the parties;
(8) The active concealment of any material fact
Id. (discussing and summarizing W. Page Keeton, Fraud, Concealment and Non-
disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1936)).
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While one might argue that parents and school districts are not "parties to
a business transaction" within the meaning of the section, such a claim
seems rather spurious. After all, parents and school districts negotiate
legally enforceable contracts with one another with significant financial
consequences for both. Facts dealing with a proposed educational
placement seem self-evidently "basic" to "the transaction,' 9 as does
eligibility for services. The mutual importance of such facts, by
themselves, should justify the imposition of a mutual disclosure
obligation. In fact, in School Board v. Fuller,210 the court had no
problem in finding parents liable for more than $170,000 based on a
constructive fraud theory for failing to disclose that they did not reside in
the county resulting in reliance by the county in providing special
education services to the child.21'
1. Real-World Problems Associated with Nondisclosure
While one might think that, given the potentially adversarial nature
of the relationship between the parties and placement negotiations
(exacerbated by the judicial interpretation of the Act's FAPE
requirement to allow school districts to provide programming with a goal
of something less than a maximization of a child's potential),212 the
situation would be rife with the potential for school district non-
disclosure, if not outright misrepresentation. In fact, there is evidence
which suggests this is the case,2 3 and the Act both implicitly and
explicitly acknowledges this possibility.214
209. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. j (1977). The comment
explains:
"Facts basic to the transaction." The word "basic" is used in this Clause in the
same sense in which it is used in Comment c under § 16 of the Restatement of
Restitution. A basic fact is a fact that is assumed by the parties as a basis for
the transaction itself. It is a fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the
transaction, and is an important part of the substance of what is bargained for or
dealt with. Other facts may serve as important and persuasive inducements to
enter into the transaction, but not go to its essence.
Id.
210. Sch. Bd. v. Fuller, 26 Va. Cir. 150 (1991).
211. Id. (though it is not entirely clear from the decision whether the parents
affirmatively misrepresented that they were living in a townhouse situated in the county
or simply failed to disclose that they moved).
212. See Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-90 (1982); see also supra text
at notes 45-49.
213. See, e.g., infra note 244.
214. Perhaps the due process procedures set forth in the Act were seen as sufficient.
The Rowley majority asserted:
Entrusting a child's education to state and local agencies does not leave the
child without protection. Congress sought to protect individual children by
providing for parental involvement in the development of state plans and
policies, . . . and in the formulation of the child's individual educational
program.
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Implicitly, the Act requires disclosure of all facts upon which the
IEP team takes into account in determining that a particular program or
placement ("special education and related services") is "designed to
enable a child with a disability to receive a free appropriate public
education as described in the individualized education program of the
child. 215 Because the Act2 16 and judicial decision guarantee parents the
right to fully participate in the IEP placement decision,217 parents are (or
should be) entitled to receive all information that the rest of the [EP team
considered in deciding that it is appropriate to recommend a particular
program for a particular child. This information includes not only test
results, evaluation reports, and the like, specifically required to be
provided under § 1415(b)(1), but any other information deemed relevant
by the team members. In jurisdictions that have held that program costs
or the relative costs of alternative placement options are relevant to the
"appropriateness" of the placement decision,21 8 it follows that cost
information-both for the program being offered and alternatives-must
be shared. Moreover, if the provision of special education is being
deemed to have a negative impact on general education or other aspects
of the school budget219 and this perception of negative impact is being
taken into consideration by the team, this must be disclosed as well. In
short, the parent's guaranteed position as a fully participating member of
the decision-making team mandates that every other member play with
his or her cards face up on the table.22°
That the drafters of the Act contemplated the possibility of outright
misrepresentation or non-disclosure and arguably imposed an affirmative
obligation to disclose is evident from language in the 2004 amendments.
Although the amendments to the Act impose a two-year statute of
limitations, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) and (ii) provide exceptions to
the requirement that a hearing be requested within two years in cases of
misrepresentation or non-disclosure by the school district.
Section 1415(f)(1)(B) makes a "resolution session" between parents
and school districts mandatory unless both sides consent to waive it. It
further makes any agreement reached at such a session enforceable in
any court of competent jurisdiction.221 However, such agreements are
458 U.S. at 208.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26)(A) (2012).
216. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (providing that parents serve as members of IEP team).
217. Winklemen ex rel. Winklemen v. Parma Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007).
Winklemen is discussed and quoted infra notes 274-286 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 99.
220. See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii)(11).
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voidable for three days,222 although no specific basis for voiding such
agreements thereafter is stated.
In fact, many would assert that non-disclosure by school districts
has become the norm. For example, because LEAs sometimes find it
necessary to contract with outside providers, a review of some of these
contract provisions is instructive. The Montgomery County
(Pennsylvania) Intermediate Unit2 23 contract, for example, forbids
outside providers from expressing programming concerns to a child's
parents, reserving "the exclusive right and opportunity" to notify parents
of such concerns.22" The same contract prohibits outside providers from
suggesting supplemental services or providing parents with "reports,
data, or information, verbally or in writing., 225 Perhaps most tellingly,
the same contract prohibits the outside provider from taking a "position,
testify[ing], or provid[ing] information to a parent or student receiving
services from the [Intermediate Unit] ... that is inconsistent with the
goals and objectives expressed regarding the student by the ...
[Intermediate Unit] .,,226
The attempt by school districts and other LEAs to ensure that
parents are kept in the dark and unable to share information with other
parents similarly situated is further evidenced by the common use of
non-disclosure provisions contained in parent-school district settlement
agreements. For example, one agreement provides:
The Parties shall maintain the terms of this Agreement in confidence
to the extent required by law. In this regard, the Parties agree that
they, or anyone on their behalf, will not reveal the terms of this
Agreement to any individual or entity, except to the extent required
by law or lawful court order or as necessary to effectuate its terms.
This Agreement will be deemed breached if either Party violates this
confidentiality and the non-breaching Party may pursue any avenue
of relief available under the law. 
227
222. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iv).
223. In Pennsylvania, Intermediate Units are educational agencies charged with the
responsibility of providing services at the regional level, including, but not limited to
early intervention services. See 11 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 875-101 (West 2014). The Boards
of Directors of the Intermediate Units are composed of school board members from each
public school district and are advised by an advisory council made up of the school
superintendents of individual counties' school districts.
224. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit, Special Education Early Intervention
Programs Contract for El Private Provider Therapy Services July 30, 2012 through June
30, 2013 (2012) (on file with author) (contracting for speech therapy).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. "John Doe" Sch. Dist., Settlement Agreement and Release (Fall, 2011) (on file
with author) (actual name redacted to protect anonymity of source).
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In fact, while therapists currently or formerly employed by LEAs are
rarely willing to speak for attribution, off the record, most will candidly
admit that they are prohibited from making certain diagnoses or
treatment proposals.228 If such a diagnosis or course of treatment is
recommended by a therapist to his or her superior or evaluation team, it
may not be communicated to the child's parent or guardian.229
2. School District Employees' Duty to Disclose
From the earliest days of the Act, courts have repeatedly stressed
the idea that educators are vested with authority to select the appropriate
methodology, as long as its provision results in the child receiving a
FAPE.23° When making such pronouncements, courts are simply
acknowledging the obvious-educators normally know much more about
programming. Thus, parents are generally dependent upon the educators
and are expected to trust their judgment in choosing a program that will
provide educational benefit to the disabled child.
There is, however, a more important question for our purposes
here-namely, what do school districts have to tell parents given that
special education teachers, speech pathologists, occupational therapists,
and so on, clearly have (or at least should have) this level of expertise
which most parents lack.231 Their expertise often includes not only the
ability to professionally evaluate the programming available within the
district, but often familiarity with other programs and types of
228. Telephone Interviews with LEA Therapists (2012-13) (notes on file with
author).
229. Id.
230. In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08 (1982), the Court
specifically acknowledged the disparity in expertise between the parties in holding that
the choice of programming is generally up to the educational agency, rather than the
parent. The Court reasoned:
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be
careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon
the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be
accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most
suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational
agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. The Act
expressly charges States with the responsibility of "acquiring and disseminating
to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped children significant
information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar
projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices
and materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice
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programming that might be more beneficial to the child, regardless of
whether the Act, as interpreted by the Court, requires the district to pay
for it.
One might think that, in cases where inappropriate or otherwise
inadequate programming options are presented to the parents of a
disabled child, the special education teacher, speech pathologist, or some
other professional member of the IEP team might well be inclined to
advise the parent of the program's inappropriateness or at least complain
to his or her supervisor. Surprisingly, however, it appears that if such a
course of action is pursued, the school district employee might well be
jeopardizing his or her job.
The evolution of the law relating to public employees' free speech
rights has resulted in a situation that is at best curious and at worst
downright coercive. In Pickering v. Board of Education,232 the Supreme
Court held that a teacher had a constitutionally protected "right to speak
on issues of public importance"2 33 and the exercise of that right "may not
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment."23 4 In 2006,
however, the Court reconsidered the issue in Garcetti v. Ceballos.235 The
Court distinguished speech made in one's capacity as citizen and speech
made pursuant to one's official duties. The former, the Court reasoned,
was protected by the First Amendment, while the latter was not.236 Thus,
in the absence of constitutional protection, a public employee may be
subject to employer discipline for expressing criticism regarding the
appropriateness of a particular program for a particular child or advising
a child's parents of other educational options.
If a special education teacher, for example, were to pull a parent
aside and make critical remarks regarding the school district's proffered
program, would that be considered as speech made pursuant to official
duties or a statement on an issue of public interest made as a concerned
citizen? Oddly, there have been relatively few cases that provide
guidance. In Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of
Education,237 the plaintiff, a speech pathologist, complained about the
school district's failure to deliver special education services and
232. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
233. Id. at 574.
234. Id.
235. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
236. Id. at 422. See generally Brenda R. Kallio & Richard T. Geisel, To Speak or
Not to Speak: Applying Garcetti and Whistleblower Law to Public School Employee
Speech, 264 WEST'S EDUC. L. RPTR. 517 (2011).
237. Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126 (10ih Cir.
2010).
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advocated for the provision of a neuropsychological evaluation and
specialized reading instruction for a particular student.238
In retaliation, the school gave her a more limited contract resulting
in a pay reduction.239 The court found that only because the plaintiffs
conduct went beyond her official duties did it retain constitutional
protection. The court stated:
Ms. Reinhardt was not hired to ensure IDEA compliance at
Albuquerque public schools. She was hired to provide speech and
language services to special education students. Ms. Reinhardt's
consulting an attorney and filing the state complaint went well
beyond her official responsibilities. APS argues that "involving an
attorney in the process does not somehow transform otherwise
unprotected speech into protected speech." While APS is correct that
attorney involvement is not dispositive, involving counsel under
these facts suggests that Ms. Reinhardt was acting beyond her job
duties.
240
On the other hand, in Fox v. Traverse City Area Public School
Board of Education,241 a teacher who complained to her supervisor that
her teaching caseload was so large that she could not provide appropriate
special educational services was found to be within the performance of
her job and, therefore, not constitutionally protected under Garcetti.242
The result of cases such as these is the creation of a situation which is, as
one commentator described it, disturbingly uncertain:
238. Id. at 1130.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1136 (internal citation omitted). Importantly, in that case the court also
found that her conduct was protected under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
1132. The court stated:
All three forms of Ms. Reinhardt's advocacy on behalf of disabled students
constitute protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 and the
ADA prohibit discrimination against any individual "because such individual
has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this Act or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
(incorporated by reference by 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)). The school is required to
provide a "free appropriate public education" by providing education and
related services that "are designed meet individual educational needs of
handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons."
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) & (b)(1) (2003).
Id.; see also Sweet v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist., 124 F. App'x 482, 486 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that retaliation for complaints regarding non-compliance with the IDEA was
prohibited under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
241. Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir.
2010).
242. Id. at 349; see also Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Cent. Sch. Dist. 836 F. Supp. 2d
132, 140, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding no constitutional protection, but possible
protection under Rehabilitation Act).
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Although some teachers' First Amendment retaliation claims
stemming from complaints about problematic school practices or
administrator wrongdoing have survived the post-Garcetti era, many
others, including claims arising from the identification of potentially
serious misconduct or the failure to meet legal obligations to
vulnerable students, have been doomed by the application of
Garcetti. Until Garcetti is reconsidered or refined, teachers' efforts
to expose school dysfunction will remain a hazardous enterprise few
may be bold enough to undertake.
243
Thus, one cannot expect individual teachers or therapists to step in.
There are two reasons for this in addition to the potential lack of First
Amendment protection. First, there is the well-known tendency of
professionals employed by school districts to band together in a
conspiracy of silence.244 This tendency is the result, at least in part, of
the law's failure to explicitly create an obligation of loyalty flowing from
the school professional to the client.245  Not surprisingly, among
members of all groups of employed professionals there exists a divided
sense of loyalty between that owed to their employers, on the one hand,
and their clients on the other.246 In cases of such divided loyalty, the
243. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critic in
Public Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253, 308-09 (2012).
244. See, e.g., Vicky M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437,
448 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (internal reference omitted) ("In October of 2003, [assistant
teachers] Celli and Medeiros approached the Principal . . . in order to voice their
concerns. During this meeting, Defendant... accused Celli and Medeiros of 'breaking a
silent code,' which she likened to a code among police officers."). Vicky M is discussed
infra notes 263-68.
245. This is not to say that professional codes of conduct are necessarily silent on the
issue. For example, the American Speech-Language Hearing Association, the
professional licensing organization for speech pathologists, provides Principle of Ethics
1: "Individuals shall honor their responsibility to hold paramount he welfare of persons
they serve professionally .. "; Rule H: "Individuals shall fully inform the persons they
serve of the nature and possible effects of services rendered .... "; and Rule I:
"Individuals shall evaluate the effectiveness of services rendered and of products
dispensed, and they shall provide services or dispense products only when benefit can
reasonably be expected." The codes of some states are somewhat stronger and more
explicit. For example, 49 PA. CODE § 45.102(d) (2014) provides, in part:
(1) A licensee shall hold paramount the welfare of persons served
professionally.
(i) A licensee shall use every resource available, including referral to other
specialists as needed, to provide the best service possible.
(ii) A licensee shall fully inform a person served, a parent or guardian, of
the nature and possible effects of the services.
246. See Jill W. Graham, Principled Organizational Dissent: A Theoretical Essay, in
8 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 12-13 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings
eds., 1986). Graham explains:
Loyalties in the workplace are multiple and frequently conflict. As a result, the
question in most instances is not whether to be loyal, but how to resolve
conflicts of loyalty. There can be loyalty as a member of one or more
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"organizational ethic" or team loyalty tends to overshadow any
conflicting loyalties.247  Furthermore, financial scarcity tends to
exacerbate organizations' tendency to stifle dissent or at least increase
hostility toward dissenting members.248 Second, although some states
have enacted whistleblower-protection legislation, the uncertainty
regarding the legal protection afforded under these laws will undoubtedly
have a chilling effect on all but the bravest or most committed.249
Because, as a practical matter, individual school district employees
cannot be expected to communicate openly with the parents of disabled
children, it is necessary that the disclosure obligation be placed on the
educational agency itself. While, as noted earlier,25° it is possible, even
likely, that a disclosure obligation exists even in the absence of finding a
fiduciary relationship, if such a relationship is found to exist, a duty to
disclose follows as a matter of course.25'
B. Fiduciaries
One in a fiduciary relationship has an affirmative disclosure
obligation to the other party to the relationship.252  Fiduciary
relationships-those involving the highest degree of trust and the
obligation to put another's interests before one's own-can be
established in at least two ways. First, some relationships, simply by
definition, are deemed fiduciary. Thus,
organizations, loyalty to co-workers and/or a profession, loyalty to civic,
ethical, and religious values, loyalty to friends and family.
Id.
247. Id. at 13; see also infra notes 259-268 (discussing Vicky M., 486 F. Supp. 2d
437).
248. Graham, supra note 246, at 33.
249. For a state-by-state catalogue of state whistleblower protection laws, see
generally Kallio & Geisel, supra note 236, at 525-27 (noting that some states require the
employee to report misconduct within the chain of command, while others do not and
concluding that this fact, "coupled with the fact that many public employees will not
know what is required or permitted under their state's whistleblower statutes" compounds
the uncertainty).
250. See supra text at notes 210-11; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
551(2)(e) (1977).
251. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). The Court
recited the general rule:
[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty
to disclose arises when one party has information "that the other [party] is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them."
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
252. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977).
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[t]he relations of trustee and cestui, executor or administrator and
creditors, next of kin or legatees, guardian and ward, principal and
agent, attorney and client, corporate director and corporation, and the
like are easily thrown into distinct subdivisions of the law. They
have distinctive names. The term "fiduciary" might well be reserved
for such relations.
253
In addition, as a factual matter, parties might enter into a
relationship where one reposes a high degree of trust in the other, and the
other accepts the responsibility that accompanies that grant of trust.
Under those circumstances, a court might well find the existence of a
fiduciary obligation as a factual matter even outside of the traditional
fiduciary relationships, though some courts term these to be "confidential
relationship[s] .254
1. Fiduciary Relationship Between School District and Child:
Acting in Loco Parentis
Whether spouses stand in a fiduciary relationship with one another
and whether parents are fiduciaries of their minor children are matters of
some disagreement.255 Some states have recognized the fiduciary nature
of the family relationships,25 6 while others deny its existence, at least as a
matter of law.257 To the extent that teachers may be seen as acting in the
253. Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 995 P.2d 721, 726 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999) (quoting Condos v. Felder, 377 P.2d 305, 308 (Ariz. 1962)).
254. Id. The court asserted:
[Tlhere are other cases where there is just as great intimacy, disclosure of
secrets, intrusting of power, and superiority of position in the case of the
representative, but where the law has no special designation for the position of
the parties. It cannot be called trust or executorship, and yet it is so similar in
its creation and operation that it should have like results.
Id.
255. See generally John E. Rumel, Back to the Future: The In Loco Parentis
Doctrine and its Impact on Whether K-12 Schools and Teachers Owe a Fiduciary Duty to
Students, 46 IND. L. REv. 711, 743-44 (2013) (noting the split in authority).
256. See In re Estate of Gelonese, 111 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
("Such a [fiduciary] relation is presumed to exist between parent and child."); Boyd v.
Boyd, 545 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("There is a fiduciary relationship
existing between Mrs. Boyd and her minor children.").
257. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kieras, 521 N.E.2d 263, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that there is no presumption of a fiduciary relationship between parents and
children); Wilson v. Wilson, 154 P.3d 1136, 1147 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that "the
mere relationship of parent and child does not raise a presumption of a confidential and
fiduciary relationship"); Latty v. St. Joseph's Soc'y of the Sacred Heart, 17 A.3d 155,
161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (citation omitted) ("While some confidential relationships
arise if there is a familial relationship, 'the mere existence of a familial relationship is not
indicative of a confidential relationship."'); Moody v. Stibling, 985 P.2d 1210, 1216
(N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that there is "no[] presumption of a fiduciary relationship
between a parent and a child").
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place of parents, in loco parentis, the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between pupil and teacher may turn on whether the particular jurisdiction
recognizes an underlying fiduciary relationship between parent and
child.258
Although under some circumstances school districts have been
found to stand in a fiduciary relationship with their pupils, most of these
cases tend to involve the situation where a teacher subjected the child to
physical or sexual abuse. Vicky M v. Northeastern Educational
Intermediate Unit 19259 is instructive. In that case, an autistic support
teacher allegedly submitted an autistic child to systematic physical
abuse.260 The teacher's duties, according to the court, included "keeping
safe and secure the autistic children in her care, custody, and control, and
attending to all of [their]... daily classroom needs .... ,261 In the
course of performing her duties, or at least under the guise of performing
her duties,
Defendant Wzorek continuously and systematically employed the use
of aversive techniques, which are deliberate activities designed to
establish a negative association with a specific behavior, and which
techniques are specifically excluded from the list of positive
approaches to behavior management found in Title 22 of the
Pennsylvania School Code (PSC), section 14.133(e). Defendant
Wzorek used aversive techniques to redirect her autistic students'
behavior, including that of Minor-Plaintiff AJM. Specifically, these
techniques included, but were not limited to: (a) striking AJM on the
legs and arms, causing bruising, (b) screaming in AJM's face, (c)
squeezing and crushing AJM's arms, causing bruising; and (d)
stomping on AJM's insteps.
262
Not only did the child's parents become aware of problems,263 but
two assistant teachers confronted the abusive teacher and, thereafter,
258. See Rumel, supra note 255, at 743-44.
259. Vicky M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 486 F. Supp. 2d 437 (M.D. Pa.
2007); see also John G. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 490 F. Supp. 2d 565 (M.D.
Pa. 2007); Joseph M. v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 516 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D. Pa.
2007).
260. Vicky M, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 446-47 (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 447. The court recapped from the complaint:
Plaintiffs noted changes in their minor child AJM's behavior, specifically a
trend of developmental regression exhibited by, inter alia: (1) screaming "Ms.
Sue hurts me"; (2) becoming increasingly aftaid of Defendant Wzorek; (3)
developing bruises on tops of his legs and the backs of his arms; (4) developing
a limp in the middle of the 2002-2003 school year; (5) developing severe
swelling in his foot; and (6) developing a burning sensation when urinating.
Id. (citation omitted).
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reported the abuse to the Intermediate Unit's director of special
education.264 The director's responded that it was a matter "'over his
head' and the IU's executive director needed to get involved.2 65
Although a meeting was scheduled with the child's parents, the teacher,
and the executive director, prior to the meeting the executive director
was overheard reassuring Wzorek, saying, "'[d]on't worry Sue, they are
coming in here to shoot their loads but nothing's going to happen and
then we'll be done with it.'
' 266
Eventually, the IU simply transferred the abusive teacher "to the
Scranton School District for the 2003-2004 school year, where she would
continue to have contact with special needs students as a learning support
teacher at West Scranton High School.,2 6 7 The whistleblowing assistant
teachers, on the other hand, were also transferred based on a report from
the Superintendent of the School District that asserted that their
"'behavior ha[d] negatively affected the work environment for [the]
teaching staff,"' and asked "'that they be removed from [the] building as
soon as possible.268
The complaint eventually filed by the parents contained numerous
counts, predictably including civil rights violations, negligence, assault
and battery, and fraud. Significantly, the fourth count alleged breach of
fiduciary duty. In this connection, the court noted:
Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he general test for determining the
existence of ... a [fiduciary] relationship is whether it is clear that
the parties did not deal on equal terms." Indeed, a fiduciary
relationship "is not confined to any specific association of the
parties." Rather, a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist "when
the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal
terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on
the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed; in both
an unfair advantage is possible."
269
Certainly, Defendant Wzorek, as the special education teacher in
charge of the instruction of Minor-Plaintiff AJM, a child with autism,
was in an overmastering position in this relationship, and was trusted
and depended upon by AJM to exercise sound judgment in handling
his care and instruction. Consequently, when viewed in the light
264. Id. at 448.




269. Id. at 458 (alterations in original).
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most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Defendant Wzorek's motion to
dismiss this Count must be denied.
2 70
While the correctness of the court's legal conclusion may seem self-
evident, other courts have displayed considerable reluctance to follow its
lead,27 1 often asserting with little analysis that no fiduciary duty is
owed. 272
Importantly, however, the physical or sexual abuse cases are not
directly relevant to the argument here. Those cases primarily deal with
the relationship between the student and teacher, rather than the
relationship between the child's parent and the educational agency itself,
acting through its teachers and school administrators.
2. Fiduciary Relationship Between School Districts and Parents:
Obligation Owed Directly to Parents
Inasmuch as disclosure obligations may be largely dependent on the
relationships between the parties, it is necessary to attempt to determine
what relationships are created under the Act and between whom. If the
right to a FAPE belonged only to the child, the parent or guardian would
be limited to seeking enforcement of the child's rights. That is, the
school district might be able to claim the existence of an arm's length
transaction with the parents. While there still might be an actionable
non-disclosure under those circumstances,273 parents would be unable to
claim that the school districts' disclosure obligations to them arise out of
a confidential or fiduciary relationship that is contemplated by and
created by the Act itself.
The Act, however, does not contemplate a bipartite relationship.
Instead, it locks the parents and school districts into a cooperative
venture entered into for the benefit of the disabled child. Not only do the
parent and the school district owe distinct obligations to the disabled
child, who is provided with independent rights under the Act, but the Act
also creates certain obligations owed by the school districts to the parent
that are independent from the obligations owed to the disabled child.
270. Vicky M, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 458-59.
271. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 759 F. Supp. 2d 477, 503-04 (D. Del. 2010)
(holding that there was no fiduciary relationship between a student and a public school
board); accord C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 291
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
272. See, e.g., Key v. Coryell, 185 S.W3d 98, 106 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Tlhe
supreme court held that a defendant priest did not owe a fiduciary duty to a parishioner.
We cannot say that appellees owed appellant [special needs student] ... any greater duty
than a pr'est owes a parishioner.").
273. See supra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
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In Winkleman ex rel. Winkleman v. Parma City School District,
27 4
the U.S. Supreme Court faced the question of whether a parent could
275appear pro se. The district court granted the school district's motion
for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that a FAPE had been
provided.2 76 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit "entered an order dismissing
the appeal unless [the parents] obtained counsel" to represent he child.2 77
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit relied on Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local
School Dist.,278 which held that the right to a free appropriate public
education "belongs to the child alone.,279 If that were the case, non-
lawyer parents could not represent their child in the federal courts.
280
After analyzing the provision of the Act, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the IDEA "includes provisions conveying rights to
parents as well as children."281 Although the school district argued that
the "IDEA accords parents nothing more than 'collateral tools related to
the child's underlying substantive rights-not freestanding or
independently enforceable rights,' 282  the Court rejected this
interpretation of the Act, insisting that the
IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking "to ensure that the rights
of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected." The word "rights" in the quoted language refers to the
rights of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the
grammatical structure would make no sense.
283
In the course of decision, the Court stressed the importance of
parental participation in the development of the child's educational
program.
IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a
disability, with parents playing "a significant role" in this process,
Parents serve as members of the team that develops the IEP. §
1414(d)(1)(B). The "concerns" parents have "for enhancing the
education of their child" must be considered by the team. IDEA
accords parents additional protections that apply throughout the IEP
process. See, e.g., § 1414(d)(4)(A) (requiring the IEP Team to revise
274. Winkleman ex rel. Winkleman v. Parma City Sch, Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
275. Id. at 520.
276. Id. at 521.
277. Id.
278. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005).
279. Id. at 757.
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (stating that parties can prosecute their own claims pro
se).
281. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 529.
282. Id. at 527-28 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 25, Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983)).
283. Id. at 528 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2012)).
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the IEP when appropriate to address certain information provided by
the parents); § 1414(e) (requiring States to "ensure that the parents of
[a child with a disability] are members of any group that makes
decisions on the educational placement of their child"). The statute
also sets up general procedural safeguards that protect the informed
involvement of parents in the development of an education for their
child. See, e.g., § 1415(a) (requiring States to "establish and
maintain procedures.., to ensure that children with disabilities and
their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the
provision of a free appropriate public education"); § 1415(b)(1)
(mandating that States provide an opportunity for parents to examine
all relevant records).
284
In the event that parents seek a review of the IEP process on procedural
grounds,
the [hearing] officer may find a child "did not receive a free
appropriate public education" only if the violation "(I) impeded the
child's right to a free appropriate public education; (11) significantly
impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the
decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate
public education to the parents' child; or (III) caused a deprivation of
educational benefits.285
The Court concluded that "Congress has found that 'the education of
children with disabilities can be made more effective by...
strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that
families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in
the education of their children at school and at home."'
2 86
Given the importance of informed and meaningful parental
participation in the process by which the IEP is formulated, taken
together with the Court's repeated acknowledgement over the years that
educators have greater technical knowledge of educational programming
(though not, of course, greater knowledge of the particular child's
strengths and weaknesses), the school's obligation to fully and honestly
disclose all relevant information to the parent so as to permit meaningful
participation necessarily follows. Allowing the school to keep its cards
face down on the table, so to speak, would be antithetical to the entire
notion of parental rights so explicitly established.2 87
284. Id. at 524 (some citations omitted).
285. Id. at 525-26 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
286. Winkelman, 550 U.S.at 535 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(5)).
287. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) which provides, in part, as follows:
The notice required by the subsection (b)(3) shall include-
(A) a description of the action proposed or refused by the agency;
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More important for immediate purposes is the nature and extent of
the obligations owed by school districts directly to the parent. While
probably not "fiduciary" in the sense that it must necessarily exist as a
matter of law, it is almost certainly possible for the relationship to be
"fiduciary" or "confidential" as a matter of fact.
288
Discussing the analogous situation of adoption and the relationship
between the adoption agency and prospective adopting parents, the court
in Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community Services,289 succinctly
summed up the situation:
An adoption is not an arms-length sale of widgets. Although the
primary purpose of adoption is to promote the well-being of children,
adoptive parents are also in a special relationship with an adoption
intermediary. Professional guidelines for adoption agencies
recognize that "child welfare agencies have a responsibility to
provide preparation, counseling and support on an ongoing basis for
all the parties involved in an adoption," and that the services provided
by an adoption agency should include protection of the interests of
adoptive parents, including their interest in making "a free and
informed decision to adopt." The counseling services an adoption
agency provides to adoptive parents further illustrate the fiduciary
nature of the relationship. As an outcome of this counseling
relationship, it is natural that adoptive parents would place special
trust in agency social workers with whom they have worked closely
and discussed intimate details of their lives.29 °
This is not to say that all parent-school district encounters will be
marked by the level of trust and reliance as is necessary to impose a
disclosure requirement and to deem non-disclosure to be
(B) An explanation of why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action
and a description of each evaluation procedure, assessment, record,  report
the agency used as a basis for the proposed or refused action; ...
(E) a description of other options considered by the IEP Team and the reason
why those options were rejected, and
(F) a description of the factors that are relevant to the agency's proposal or
refusal.
In substance, the disclosure requirements are repeated in 20 U.S.C. §
1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I)(aa)-(dd) (stating similar requirements applicable for the LEA
response if no prior written notice given).
288. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
289. Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
290. Id. at 728 (quoting D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and
Nothing But the Truth: The Limits of Liability For Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 851, 908 (1992)).
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misrepresentation.29' In many cases, particularly where there has been an
ongoing course of acrimonious conflict and it has become clear that the
parties are dealing with one another at arms-length, or where the parents
are themselves professionals having familiarity with the relevant
information, there will be no justifiable reliance or expectation that the
school district is acting in their or their child's best interest. Ultimately,
it is a question of fact.
292
However, both the letter and spirit of the Act rather explicitly
envision a cooperative relationship between parents and school districts
working for the good of the child, though the Act also recognizes or even
anticipates the potential for an adversarial relationship between school
and parents. Nevertheless, to overly stress the potential conflict arising
out of the school's attempt to satisfy its responsibility of meeting the
child's entitlement to an appropriate education (however defined)
discounts the importance of the fundamentally non-adversarial position
of parents and educators. The relationship between parties is critical in
determining both the obligation to disclose and the extent of that
obligation. In these cases, all of the hallmarks of a fiduciary
relationship-inequality of knowledge, inequality in bargaining power,
disproportionate expertise by the school districts, and justified
expectation (at least initially) that the school districts will act to protect
the child's interests-may well exist.
C. Remedies for Non-Disclosure
1. Remedies Within the Act
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the educational agency was
under a duty to disclose the existence of better programming than that
which is being offered, and the agency failed or refused to inform the
parent. If this non-disclosure "impeded the parents' opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the parents' child," it would
constitute a procedural violation of the type that would allow the hearing
officer to find that the child was denied a FAPE.293 That finding would
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1977) provides:
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce
the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the
matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the
other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
292. See supra note 257.
293. Winkleman ex rel. Winkleman v. Parma City Sch, Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26
(2007).
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(or at least could) provide the basis for ordering that the school district
provide compensatory educational services.294
In addition, if the parents and school district have entered into a
settlement agreement, it might be possible for the parents to rescind the
agreement that was induced by fraud,295 though the availability of
rescission may depend on the point at which the fiaud took place. Since
a settlement agreement between the parents and school district is a
contract, at the very least it is subject to all of the normal contract rules
regarding validity.296 Moreover, if it involves the waiver of a federally
guaranteed civil right, perhaps a higher standard is to be applied.29 7
In any case, the established rules regarding the rescission
undoubtedly also apply. There are, however, at least two glitches, one
written into the law and the second inherent in the dynamics of parent-
school district interaction. The 1997 Amendments to the Act added a
provision making "[d]iscussions that occur during the mediation
process... confidential and. .. [precluding their use] as evidence in any
subsequent due process hearing or civil proceeding.'298 While this
provision was, undoubtedly, included to encourage candor from all
parties,299 the effect is that misrepresentations or failures to disclose
information that might be relevant to the formation of the contract and its
voidability, at least those made during the course of mediation, are made
inadmissible.300  This is not to say, however, that the evidentiary
restriction would apply to a nondisclosure that can be traced back to
294. See generally Terry Jean Seligmann & Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory
Education for IDEA Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies?, 45 URB. LAw. 281, 288-89
(2013) (noting a denial of parental participation is a procedural violation for which
compensatory education might be available). But see Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,
538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that compensatory education is available
only for gross violations of the IDEA).
295. See, e.g., Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 239 (D. Conn. 2000)
(recognizing the agreement was voidable on the basis of fraud or mutual mistake but
finding the hearing officer's refusal to set aside a settlement agreement on those bases
was supported by the record).
296. See generally Weber, supra note 132, at 651-52.
297. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
298. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(G) (2012).
299. See, e.g., J.D. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 571 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir.
2009) ("[This] provision[] ... ensure[s] that mediation discussions will not be chilled by
the threat of disclosure at some later date. Enforcing the confidentiality provision is
therefore critical to ensuring that parties trust the integrity of the mediation process and
remain willing to engage in it.").
300. Possibly, there is one exception. In an unpublished decision returned in 2012, a
federal district court declined to strike a school district allegation that a disabled child's
father made the statement hat he was using the mediation process to run up the school
district's expenses and thus force them to accede to his demands. See Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist. v. Zhou, No. 09-03493, 2010 WL 2928005, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2010).
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interactions independent of the mediation process, at the resolution
conference stage or at IEP team meetings, for example.
Moreover, if the agreement is reached as a result of the resolution
session process,301 the Act declares that the agreement is voidable for
three days.30 2 In all probability, this condition was intended to deal with
buyer's remorse or, because attorneys typically are not present at the
resolution session,30 3 the three-day provision provides parents an
opportunity to consult with counsel before the agreement becomes
binding.30 4 It seems highly unlikely that the provision was intended to
limit rescission to three days in cases of fraud, particularly since 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) and (ii) indicate that the two-year statute of
limitations is tolled by fraud or nondisclosure.
If parents, upon learning of the district's misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, privately place their child and then seek reimbursement
for tuition and cost of the private placement, whether they are found to
be entitled to reimbursement depends, in part, on the equities of the
situation.30 5 While there do not appear to be any cases directly on point,
private placement after discovery of nondisclosure of a better program's
existence likely constitutes the type of circumstances that would make a
compelling case for reimbursement on the equities.306
2. Remedies Outside of the Act
The remedies which might be available for a failure to disclose in a
case in which a duty to disclose has been found depend, in large part, on
whether and to what extent those remedial provisions of the Act are
found to be exclusive. As noted, this is an issue upon which there
301. See 20 U.S.C § 1415 (f)(1)(B) (2012).
302. Id. § 1415 (f)(1)(B)(iv).
303. Id. § 1415 (i)(3)(D)(iii)(l)-(1I); see also supra notes 107-110 and
accompanying text.
304. See generally Mr. S. v. Rochester Cmty. Sch., No. 5:06-CV-53, 2006 WL
2830042, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2006) (discussing the limitations on attorney's
participation at resolution sessions).
305. See supra notes 94, 177-79 and accompanying text.
306. See generally Wolfe v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (considering the school's failure to present options to parents in finding
that equities favored reimbursement); W.M. v. Lakeland Cent. Sch. Dist., 783 F. Supp. 2d
497, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The court reasoned:
By contrast, the School District initially denied that it was even responsible for
conducting an evaluation of O.M. and it maintained this incorrect position until
at least October 11, 2007. Thus, at a minimum, the equities favor reimbursing
the plaintiffs for tuition expenses from the period of March 28, 2008 through
the end of the 2007-2008 school year.
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remains considerable debate.3 °7 While it is agreed that both claims under
the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act can be brought
simultaneously, the question of whether one can bring a federal civil
rights act claim under § 1983 based on a violation of the IDEA has
resulted in a split among the circuits.308 In the Second and Seventh
Circuits, however, which have continued to recognize the possibility that
an IDEA violation may be actionable under § 1983, nondisclosure may
give rise to an action for damages. Furthermore, subject to the federal
exhaustion limitations,30 9 other federal or constitutional claims or state
law claims might also be based on fraudulent nondisclosure and breach
of fiduciary duty.
CONCLUSION
Over the past century or so, American political culture has
repeatedly swung back and forth between welfare state progressivism,
with its emphasis on government's role in providing basic services to
advance societal goals, and various forms and degrees of laissez faire
capitalism, with its emphasis on individualism, the sanctity of contract
and minimized collective responsibility.310  The enactment of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975 reflected, perhaps
embodied, the progressivism of its day. It is no coincidence that, on a
state level, pro-plaintiff tort law peaked at the same time.311
The four decades that followed, however, have, for the most part,
witnessed the steady erosion of the accident victims' right to claim
compensation.3  And, as I argued elsewhere, one of the primary
strategies of the tort reform movement was to recast the victim from one
fairly seeking just compensation for harm inflicted upon him or her to
that of greedy opportunist.313 One can observe the same strategy being
employed in the realm of social welfare programs. President Reagan, for
307. See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 147-148.
309. See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
310. To be somewhat more accurate, the political culture of individualism can be
traced back to the American colonial period. See generally Stanley Feldman & John
Zaller, The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State,
36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 268, 271 (1992).
311. Regarding the expansion and subsequent contraction of tort law, see Kotler,
supra note 19 passim. See also Martin A. Kotler, Tort Reform and Implied Conflict
Preemption, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 827, 832-60 (2011) (discussing products liability
doctrine during this period of time).
312. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 647-53 (1992); see also Kotler, supra
note 19; Kotler, Implied Conflict Preemption, supra note 311.
313. Kotler, supra note 19, at 795-96.
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example, recast welfare recipients as "welfare queens,314 and coined the
memorable phrase of "the truly needy" as a means of limiting the class of
eligible recipients.315
It is odd, though not really surprising, that parents seeking public
education for their disabled children were tarred with the same brush.
This was true notwithstanding the undeniable fact that the tacit
accusation of greed is completely incoherent in that context, as, arguably,
no personal gain is even being sought. Moreover, the underlying goal of
universal public education with the resultant creation of an educated,
productive citizenry is commonly championed by both the political right
and left.
In any event, both the legislative response of repeated amendments
to the Act serving to inhibit legal representation and the judicial
interpretation of the Act serving to elevate the sanctity of private
contract, even when the contracts prove to undercut the fundamental goal
of the Act,316 largely has made the enforcement provisions of the law
illusory to all but the wealthiest. Ironically, it is the wealthiest who have
the least need for the substantive promises and procedural protections of
the law-at least if they are wealthy enough to afford to privately
educate their children.
But, what if the relationship between parents and school districts is
recognized to be fiduciary in nature? If so, the existence of a fiduciary or
similar relation of trust and confidence would profoundly affect the
extent to which disclosure is required and the enforceability of contracts
between parties in such a relationship. Thus, for example, the
Restatement of Contracts declares that "[t]here is no privilege of non-
disclosure, by a party who ... occupies such a relation to the other party
as to justify the latter in expecting that his interests will be cared
for .... ,,317 Comment c explains:
A fiduciary position within the meaning of the Section includes not
only the position of one who is a trustee, executor, administrator, or
the like, but that of agent, attorney, trusted business advisor, and
indeed any person whose relation with another is such that the latter
justifiably expects his welfare to be cared for by the former.
318
314. 'Welfare Queen' Becomes I sue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1976, at 51.
315. See AMOS KIEWE & DAVIS W. HOUCK, A SHINING CITY ON A HILL: RONALD
REAGAN'S ECONOMIC RHETORIC, 1951-1989, at 79 (1991) (citing and analyzing Mr.
Reagan's 1971 speech to the American Association of University Women).
316. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
317. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 472 (1932).
318. Id. § 472 cmt. c.
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Similarly, the Restatement of Restitution, while denying a general
disclosure obligation, unequivocally asserts that "a person who stands in
a fiduciary or confidential relationship to the other party has a duty to
reveal all relevant facts."319
The proposal here for mandated disclosure at best would only be a
partial solution. By itself, its adoption would not change the substantive
programming requirements to which the school districts must adhere. It
would not eliminate the disparity in power between the schools and the
parents-a growing disparity that increasingly distorts the bargaining
process. 32° What it would do, however, is introduce a level of
transparency and honesty into the process and minimize the game
playing that presently characterizes so much of the parent-school district
interaction.
Although the legal and equitable remedies for nondisclosure were
briefly noted above,321 the real importance of recognizing the disclosure
obligation lies not in remedies flowing from a failure to fulfill the duty,
but the advantages that flow from compliance with the obligation. After
all, the goal is to create an impetus toward making the Act function as
intended, not just remedy its violation.
In addition to shifting political attitudes, the failure of the Act lies in
the disintegration of trust between parents and educational agencies and,
since trust was and is at the core of the cooperative venture envisioned
by the Act, the goals of the Act cannot be achieved without it. Although
part of the problem lies in the underlying issue of resource allocation,
that is not the full story. The limitation of resources necessary to achieve
the educational goals is an undeniable reality in this political climate, but
it need not pit the parties against one another. The acrimony is a product
of the inevitable failure of the school's attempt to hide the problem of
inadequate programming by dealing dishonestly with parents, not a
product of the realization that there exists an underlying shortage of
available resources in the first place.
In any case, there is no question that distrust has been engendered
and has served to undermine the foundations of the IDEA, and disclosure
is the only way to restore that trust. The funding shortages will not
disappear and there will inevitably be disagreements on whether parental
expectations are realistic or not, but disclosure may allow at least the
funding shortage to reclaim its rightful place as a political problem of
resource allocation (with all of its associated moral and ethical
overtones), rather the source of accusations of greed and evil.
319. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 8 (1937).
320. See supra note 130.
321. See supra notes 294-309 and accompanying text.
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Differing expectations between the parents of disabled children and
the educational establishment regarding the child's needs and the
school's capacity and willingness to meet those needs need not turn the
parties into adversaries dealing with one another from a position of
distrust.3 22  In fact, the Act envisioned disagreement and provided a
means by which resolution might be achieved. The dispute resolution
process, however, depends on each of the parties believing that the other
is acting in good faith. That becomes impossible once there arises the
perception that information is being withheld. It is the mutual suspicion
that distorts the cooperative enterprise model envisioned by the drafters
of the Act.
Power imbalances between parents and school districts cannot be
eliminated, but the mandatory provision of information will go a long
way to level the playing field and restore some level of trust.323 While
parents will invariably strive to maximize their children's potential and
school districts will do what they can given the limitations inherent in
public education, a disclosure obligation will at least put everyone on the
same page. Parents that have the resources to give their children more
will spend those resources, not wasting valuable time under the mistaken
belief that the best is already being provided. Parents without the
resources to provide private education will be forced to lobby the schools
and elected officials to equalize public and private education. They may
be successful, or may not be, but in either case, the hypocrisy and
deception that presently characterizes so much of the parent-school
interaction will be minimized. If educators are made sufficiently
uncomfortable by being required to confront and acknowledge the
inequality between public and private programming, they will be forced
to either improve public education or join with parents to form a new
coalition much like that which was responsible for the law's
enactment.
324
322. See Lake & Billingsley, supra note 14, at 244 (noting that "[d]iscrepant views
of a child or a child's needs was identified as a category of factors that initiate or escalate
conflict in 90% of participant interviews").
323. Id. at 248 (identifying the "perception of withholding information . . . as a
factor that escalated conflicts").
324. See generally Marvin Lazerson, The Origins of Special Education, in SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES: THEIR HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCE 41-42 (Jay G.
Chambers & William T. Hartman eds., 1983) (describing the parent-educator coalition
that was instrumental in the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975).
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